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ASSEMBLED PRODUCTS: THE KEY TO MORE
EFFECTIVE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST
OVERSIGHT IN HEALTH CARE
William M. Sage†
This Article argues that recent calls for antitrust enforce-
ment to protect health insurers from hospital and physician
consolidation are incomplete.  The principal obstacle to effec-
tive competition in health care is not that one or the other party
has too much bargaining power, but that they have been buy-
ing and selling the wrong things.  Vigorous antitrust enforce-
ment will benefit health care consumers only if it accounts for
the competitive distortions caused by the sector’s long history
of government regulation.  Because of regulation, what pass
for products in health care are typically small process steps
and isolated components that can be assigned a billing code,
even if they do little to help patients.  Instead of further en-
trenching weakly competitive parties engaged in artificial com-
merce, antitrust enforcers and regulators should work
together to promote the sale of fully assembled products and
services that can be warranted to consumers for performance
and safety.  As better products emerge through innovation
and market entry, competition may finally succeed at lowering
medical costs, increasing access to treatment, and improving
quality of care.
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INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE
Six years after the passage of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), what has been mainly ideo-
logical opposition to “Obamacare” is acquiring a more opera-
tional character.  Critics are being forced to define more
specifically the reasons for their discontent and to formulate
modifications short of repeal.1  Thus far, the health reform de-
bate has focused primarily on coverage mandates and associ-
ated subsidies for the poor and uninsurable.2  As will become
apparent, however, the big issue in American health care is not
redistribution.  The big issue is inefficiency.
As conservatives re-engage the health reform debate, their
asserted belief in the power of market forces cannot sidestep a
simple question: Why does the ostensibly competitive U.S.
health care system cost so much and deliver so little?  In other
sectors of the economy, the United States celebrates, relies on,
and legally protects market competition.3  Health care in this
country is similarly dominated by private, revenue-seeking ac-
tivity.4  Yet the outcomes of competition in health care signifi-
cantly lag performance in other industries.5
Is competition anemic in health care because legal over-
sight is lax?6  Is not enough attention paid to monopoly and
1 See David Lawder, Senate Republicans Pass Budget Plan, Eye Obamacare
Repeal, REUTERS (May 5, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/06/
us-usa-budget-idUSKBN0NQ2DD20150506 [http://perma.cc/5U9X=GLTP] (not-
ing that while President Obama will certainly veto any repeal of the ACA, the
possibility of negotiating changes thereto remains open); Heidi Przybyla, Senate
Budget Allows Republicans to Seek Obamacare Repeal, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 5,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-05/senate-adopts-
budget-that-lets-republicans-seek-obamacare-repeal [http://perma.cc/M6UU-
EUXG] (stating that the chances of outright appeal of the ACA are slim).
2 See Gail R. Wilensky, The Shortfalls of “Obamacare,” 367 NEW ENG. J.
MEDICINE 1479, 1479 (2012); Przybyla supra note 1. R
3 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, CASES AND PROCEEDINGS, https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings [https://perma.cc/76L6-GPDM]
(detailing various cross-sector enforcement actions brought by the FTC with the
goal of protecting market competition).
4 See CARL F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOP-
OLY TO MARKET COMPETITION 135–36 (2006) (discussing the FTC’s removal of barri-
ers to competition in the health care space and the dominance of the private
market).
5 See id. (discussing industry-specific struggles that the FTC faced).
6 Legal oversight of competition is accomplished primarily through antitrust
law.  Federal antitrust law consists of a small number of statutes that authorize
the U.S. Department of Justice and the FTC, as well as private litigants, to seek
sanctions against parties engaging in anticompetitive practices. See Sherman Act
of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. 52–53 (2012); Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).  Antitrust law generally develops from judicial interpreta-
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oligopoly?  Are cartels less effectively detected and deterred?
Do more subtle collusive behaviors among health care provid-
ers, insurers, and suppliers harm consumers but not provoke a
legal response?  Or are there other explanations for the failure
of competition in health care to deliver the best possible prod-
ucts at the lowest possible price?
These questions are coming to the fore as implementation
of the ACA continues, leading more health care organizations
to consolidate and coordinate their activities.7  For the first
time since the 1990s, policymakers face critical decisions
about the focus and intensity of federal antitrust enforcement
activities.8
This Article proposes a competition policy for American
health care that not only is consistent with generally applicable
antitrust law but also works together with regulatory reform to
improve market outcomes for health care consumers.  Such a
policy must be more than a political and legal settlement be-
tween collectivist and free-market ideologies for control of the
U.S. health care system.  It must revisit basic questions about
who competes in health care, what they compete to provide,
and how that competition can be vigorous and successful.  The
stakes are considerable.  The United States devotes nearly one-
sixth of its economy to health care,9 crowding out other pro-
ductive activities and denying Americans those benefits as both
consumers and citizens.
The Article suggests a new explanation for why the Ameri-
can health care system is only weakly competitive and offers
guidance to the federal antitrust agencies, health care regula-
tors, and the courts regarding a more effective competition pol-
icy as health reform proceeds.  In addition to consolidation,
previous analyses have emphasized lack of consumer informa-
tion, moral hazard from insurance, and the need for treatment
tion of these statutes, the enforcement decisions of the two federal agencies, and
guidance documents that the agencies release from time to time.  States have
similar laws, often enforced by state attorneys general.
7 See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 11, 28 (2014) (discussing the consolidation of the health care industry as a
response to the ACA).
8 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BERENSON & RACHEL A. BURTON, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF:
NEXT STEPS FOR ACOS 1, 5 (2012) (discussing the controversy regarding modifica-
tions to the antitrust enforcement regime for accountable care organizations, or
ACOs).




\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 5 16-MAR-16 15:47
2016] ASSEMBLED PRODUCTS 613
among those without the ability to pay for it.  Some of these
factors are cited by supporters of single-payer systems and
other forms of national health insurance, while critics of such
“socialized medicine” argue that government failure from sup-
planting the market would be worse than market failure is
today.
Instead, this Article posits that prices for health care are
too high, quality too unreliable, and innovation too limited in
large part because we have been buying and selling the wrong
things.  In other complex economic sectors, consumers
purchase assembled products from which they expect con-
crete, demonstrable benefits.  Producers aggressively manage
their supply chains, product performance can be measured,
and products can be warranted for safety and effectiveness.  In
health care, by contrast, most consumers purchase only iso-
lated process steps and components.10  Physicians strive to
deliver reimbursable relative value units (RVUs),11 not defini-
tive treatment packages.  Hospitals coproduce care in vague
collaboration with physicians and often have limited leverage
over expensive inputs such as medical devices.12  This causes
the health care we receive to be shoddily put together, overly
costly to produce, insufficiently responsive to consumers’
needs, and difficult to monitor for quality.
Why did assembled health care products not develop natu-
rally as an outgrowth of competition?  Presumably, it is not
because consumers of health care prefer confusion, unac-
countability, or waste.  Rather, it is because government poli-
cies, not free enterprise, have made the principal revenue-
seeking actors in the U.S. health care system look and act the
way they do.13  Put differently, many health care transactions
are socially constructed rather than market-driven, which cre-
ates the illusion of competition but not the reality.
The American health care system is rife with laws that
shape the competitive terrain, largely dictating how competi-
tion occurs, which parties it involves, what dimensions it em-
10 See Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Viable Alternative to Medicare’s Physi-
cian Payment Strategy, 33 HEALTH AFF. 153, 154–55 (2014) (discussing the divi-
sion of health care services into discrete units of service).
11 See id. at 155 (reviewing history of Medicare physician payment based on
relative value units).
12 See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 175, 225–26 (2014) (discussing the FDA’s gatekeeping power with respect to
new medical devices).
13 ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED FREE-
MARKET HEALTH CARE 24 (2014) (discussing the crucial role of public initiatives in
contemporary private health care).
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phasizes, and whether it succeeds or fails in generating
economic benefits for consumers.14  Many laws are of such
longstanding duration that they have become deeply ingrained
in industry culture and practice.15  The cumulative effects of
this regulatory history are to define products based on profes-
sional traditions rather than demonstrated utility and to
render many prices arbitrary, particularly for hospital
services.16
14 Regulation influences not only static characteristics of health care markets
but also their dynamic potential—the forms innovation takes and the processes
by which it occurs.  Nearly all industries take pride in making their products and
services less expensive, more convenient, and more reliable.  The health care
system has downplayed these consensus goals of innovation.  It generates new
“stuff” in abundance, particularly patentable technologies with specialized uses,
regardless of cost, convenience, or certainty of benefit.  It devotes far less attention
to process reengineering, supply chain management, and other ways to improve
productive efficiency and satisfy consumer preferences.  For a more optimistic
view of the future, see James C. Robinson, Biomedical Innovation in the Era of
Health Care Spending Constraints, 34 HEALTH AFF. 203, 203 (2015) (arguing that
the era of “cost-unconscious” innovation described above is over and health care
innovation is now likely to become more efficient while focusing on “design, pric-
ing, and distribution principles”).
15 Although antitrust law polices private conduct that impedes competition, it
yields readily to other laws, whether federal or state, intended to regulate eco-
nomic activity on a less competitive basis. See Matthew McDonald, Antitrust
Immunity Up In Smoke: Preemption, State Action, and the Master Settlement Agree-
ment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 97, 97–98 (2013) (discussing states’ regulatory actions
that would otherwise result in violations of the federal antitrust laws).  However,
the regulatory environment is not a defense to private anticompetitive conduct
under the antitrust laws unless Congress impliedly repeals those laws or states
adopt structured alternatives to competition that qualify for “state action” immu-
nity.  The Supreme Court recently issued proenforcement rulings in three cases
brought by the FTC that involved regulated entities: the acquisition by a public
hospital of its principal competitor, FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Systems, 133 S.
Ct. 1003 (2013) (public authority to acquire hospitals did not create state action
immunity), a “reverse payment settlement” in which the plaintiff paid the defen-
dant to resolve an infringement suit involving a generic challenger to a patented
drug, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (reverse payment settlements
subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason), and a campaign by a state
dental board to threaten nondentist teeth whitening businesses and their land-
lords with criminal prosecution, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v.
FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (licensing board controlled by members of the regu-
lated profession must be actively supervised by the state itself to claim antitrust
immunity).
16 See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits
Are Destroying Our Healthcare, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, at 24–26 (criticizing the exor-
bitant cost of hospital services).  Similar forces are at play in countries with
socialized health care systems, but constraints on medical spending are stronger,
so that the competitive distortions they produce are smaller. See Jonathan Ober-
lander & Joseph White, Public Attitudes Toward Health Care Spending Aren’t the
Problem; Prices Are, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1285, 1285 (2015) (discussing the United
States’ high medical spending compared to nations with greater constraints on
spending).
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Rather than argue against medical markets, the Article
calls on competition policymakers to rethink the product as
they carry out their legally mandated functions.  No matter how
aggressively antitrust law is enforced, it remains a weak tool for
improving consumer welfare in health care if many prices,
nonprice attributes, and choices relate mainly to faux prod-
ucts.  Better outcomes are possible only if the antitrust author-
ities demand greater competition to deliver fully assembled
products that have measurable value to consumers, and if
those authorities work closely with legislators and regulators to
remake the laws that hinder such products from developing on
their own.
Some competition policy is already moving in this direction
as the health care industry restructures in response to existing
pressures on its financial model and to the likely direction of
health care reform.17  But much is not.  In particular, fear of
higher provider prices following consolidation has led the fed-
eral antitrust enforcement agencies to bring a new series of
challenges to hospital mergers and acquisitions.18  The evalua-
tion under antitrust law of consumer harm from consolidation
and restructuring should be a forward-looking inquiry, partic-
ularly in health care where prevailing market conditions do not
reflect a private competitive equilibrium and where regulatory
developments continually change the dimensions and dynam-
ics of competition.  Yet much of the agencies’ skepticism of
consolidation assumes the continuation of regulatory policies
that are clearly obsolete.
17 See MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE
IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 2 (2012) (noting the more aggressive
stance of the FTC in recent years as the health care industry restructures).
18 See id. at 1–2.  In 2015, a series of high-profile mergers were announced
among health insurers. See Robert Laszewski, Health Insurer Merger Mania—
Muscle-Bound Competitors and a New Cold War in Health Care, FORBES (July 27,
2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlaszewski2/2015/07/27/
health-insurer-merger-mania-muscle-bound-competitors-and-a-new-cold-war-
in-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/7HKZ-ZCQS] (discussing possible motives
and effects of insurer consolidation).  There are several possible motives for sud-
den consolidation among insurers, including economies of scale, countervailing
bargaining power against large hospital systems, and maintaining dominance in
local markets.  In addition, consolidated insurers would be “too big to fail,” and
would be in a position of particular advantage when doing business with the
federal government in Medicare managed care (so-called Medicare Advantage
plans) and in the ACA’s health insurance exchanges.  The consolidation of health
insurers today therefore is reminiscent of defense contractors following the end of
the Cold War. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Korb, Merger Mania: Should the Government
Pay for Defense Industry Restructuring?, BROOKINGS INST. (1996), http://
www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1996/06/summer-defenseindustry-korb
[http://perma.cc/4Y7J-TUKN].
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This does not mean that the current wave of health care
provider consolidation is necessarily benign, or that antitrust
enforcers should lighten their hand.19  It does imply, however,
that the antitrust agencies should work closely with federal
and state regulators as the ACA is implemented to refine pre-
dictive tools, reduce barriers to entry and innovation, and ori-
ent both regulatory and enforcement activities explicitly to
desired outcomes.
This approach to market oversight would consciously iden-
tify and promote specific dimensions and dynamics of competi-
tion that have been less than vigorous in the past, such as the
characteristics of health care products, rather than assuming
that those practices reflect consumer preferences.  Instead of
refighting the last war over managed care, which emphasized
contract negotiations between health insurers and large health
care providers, competition policymakers would urge the
health care establishment to redefine and improve the prod-
ucts it sells.  They would also protect emerging subsectors of
the health care system that might generate more meaningful
products from appropriation by entrenched provider, insurer,
or supplier interests.
Part I of the Article explains why the nature of the product
is a critical but previously unrecognized determinant of health
care competition, tracing its origins to a legal and regulatory
regime that has long distorted and constrained medical mar-
kets.  Part II describes recent experience with managed care
and hospital mergers and demonstrates the perils of making
assumptions about health care antitrust enforcement as the
regulatory environment changes.  Part III identifies aspects of
antitrust analysis that bear directly on product improvement,
makes enforcement recommendations regarding case selection
and evaluation, and proposes a set of priorities that antitrust
19 See GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 17, at 6 (summarizing further changes in R
the structure of the health care market and the policy effect of the FTC’s aggres-
sive response to consolidation); WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD
JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY
OF HOSPITAL CARE? 11–12 (2006) (outlining the changes in hospital structure and
quality of care brought about by consolidation and potential policy shifts in reac-
tion thereto); Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Is Hospital Competition
Socially Wasteful?, 115 Q.J. ECON. 577, 577 (2000) (concluding that, in the 1980s,
the welfare effects of competition were ambiguous; in the 1990s, however, compe-
tition improved social welfare); Daniel P. Kessler & Jeffrey J. Geppert, The Effects
of Competition on Variation in the Quality and Cost of Medical Care 3–4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11226, 2005) (analyzing the effects
of hospital competition on the level of and the variation in quality of care and
hospital expenditures for elderly Medicare beneficiaries suffering heart attacks);
see also infra text accompanying notes 366–77. R
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enforcers and health care regulators should pursue jointly to
induce commerce in more meaningful products.
I
THE HIDDEN PROBLEM: UNASSEMBLED PRODUCTS
Vigorous demand for health care, meaning both willing-
ness and ability to pay for it in private marketplaces, should
create strong incentives for capable supply: high output, com-
petitive prices, quality, choice, and innovation.  This has not
happened.  After decades of rhetoric unsupported by data, the
United States has finally begun to acknowledge that its health
care system is not superior to other countries’.20  The overall
quality of care we provide is average, and it is plagued by
shameful amounts of error, inattention, and waste.21  Our
clinical technologies remain marvels, but we deploy them with
appalling mediocrity.  In the aggregate, nearly $1 trillion of the
over $3 trillion invested annually on American health care may
be misspent.22
American health care innovation, itself an important com-
petitive outcome, has neglected improvements in the organiza-
tion of care delivery and the achievement of verifiable health
outcomes at both the individual and population levels.23  In-
stead, it has mainly served to proliferate diagnostic and thera-
peutic technologies that are improperly used in many
instances.24  Antitrust enforcers assert a desire to promote in-
novation through competition, but the most important innova-
tions in health care delivery will focus on better ways to
incorporate technology into processes of care, not just technol-
ogy for its own sake.
A. Unassembled Products and the Hegemony of U.S.
Physicians
In his Pulitzer prize-winning 1982 book, sociologist Paul
Starr catalogued the 150-year transformation of American
medicine into the powerful economic and scientific engine it is
20 See generally SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS
1–2 (1997) (discussing public opinion supporting a need for drastic reform to the
U.S. health care system).
21 INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 101–02 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the
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today.25  At the heart of his analysis was the American medical
profession, which he portrayed as the fixed point of control on
which “revolutionary” change in health care ultimately
turned.26  Although several massive industries have grown
alongside the medical profession, competitive models of health
care delivery still rely heavily on physician direction, as do
proposals for new organizational forms such as the Accounta-
ble Care Organization (ACO) and the “patient-centered medical
home” (PCMH).27
In keeping with this core assumption, antitrust law has
been solicitous of good-faith efforts by physicians to improve
care or reduce costs and has been deferential to the methods
they choose to accomplish those goals.28  When physicians
stray beyond even these generous boundaries, moreover, anti-
trust enforcers often have been satisfied merely to exact a
promise to behave better in the future.29  Contrary to the gen-
eral preference in antitrust law for structural rather than con-
duct remedies for proven anticompetitive activities,30 the
enforcement agencies and the courts have only rarely at-
tempted to influence how health care organizations that in-
clude physicians should be organized, or how unconcentrated
markets for physician services should remain.31
To a surprising degree, even highly sophisticated medical
services are still conceptualized as extensions of an individual
doctor’s traditional black bag and prescription pad.  There was
a time, increasingly remote from the present day, when diagno-
sis, prognosis, and treatment were solo tasks using handheld
25 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982)
(discussing the social history of the medical profession in America).
26 See id. at 17–20.
27 A patient-centered medical home (PCMH) is a primary care model that
offers coordinated, accessible care that is focused on quality and safety. Patient-
Centered Medical Home Recognition, NCQA, http://www.ncqa.org/Programs/Re
cognition/Practices/PatientCenteredMedicalHomePCMH.aspx [http://perma.cc/
6YUV-RX24].
28 Antitrust law was rarely engaged with medicine until the 1970s. See CARL
F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY TO MARKET
COMPETITION 136–37 (2008) (discussing key events that led to the United States’
market-based health system); see infra text accompanying notes 335–40 (discuss- R
ing clinical integration).
29 Thomas L. Greaney, The Tangled Web: Integration, Exclusivity and Market
Power in Provider Contracting, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 59, 88–90 (2014).
30 See Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Remedies in the United States: Adhering to Sound
Principles in a Multi-Faceted Scheme (Oct. 4, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/200354.htm [https://perma.cc/YHL6-6TJ7].
31 Greaney, supra note 29, at 70 (discussing the failure of enforcement agen- R
cies and the courts to influence hospital organizational structure).
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equipment.  Recommended medication was conveyed directly
from physician to patient with instructions for administration.
Transfer of care from one physician to another was complete
when it occurred, albeit with transfer back to the original phy-
sician in most cases involving general practitioners and
specialists.
The only aspect of this paradigm that remains similar to-
day is the strength of the therapeutic bond between a patient
and the individual that patient perceives as his or her expert
caregiver.  Chemical complexity of therapeutic agents was
largely solved within the conventional framework by having
physicians write prescriptions to be filled by pharmacies for
substances developed by pharmaceutical manufacturers.  But
nearly everything else modern medicine offers, beginning with
surgical treatment, requires the coordinated participation of
many individuals with different skills and training in one or
more settings with advanced physical plants, fixed technolo-
gies, consumable supplies, and information resources.
What is bought and sold in health care markets has not
kept pace with these technical advances.  In other industries,
complex products are sold as assembled units that consumers
understand, that function as advertised, and that can be com-
pared to one another.  They are constructed by the manufac-
turer and typically are offered with some form of warranty for
performance as intended.  By contrast, health care emphasizes
incomplete process steps and isolated components rather than
assembled products.  Each physician not only performs per-
sonal tasks and prescribes medication but also “orders” goods
and services from diagnostic tests to hospitalization, all of
which are provided by others.  The same physician also “refers”
patients for consultation by additional physicians and other
health professionals.  Many of these consultants behave simi-
larly.  Coordination among physicians caring for a particular
patient tends also to be unstructured, governed more by pro-
fessional conventions than by industrial principles.
Consequently, although the fees that physicians earn
amount only to about 15% of annual health care expenditures
in the United States, an additional 50% or so is initiated and
channeled by physicians through their ordering and referral
behavior.32  Among other things, this telling statistic explains
32 Health policy experts generally put this number at between 2/3 and 3/4 of
health care spending. Cf. Louis Goodman & Timothy Norbeck, Who’s to Blame for
Our Rising Healthcare Costs?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2013, 9:31 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/04/03/whos-to-blame-for-our-rising-
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the proliferation of fraud and abuse laws.  The federal govern-
ment, which administers Medicare and Medicaid, has enacted
sweeping prohibitions on the payment of remuneration to phy-
sicians in exchange for orders or referrals, and on “self-referral”
to entities in which the physician has a financial interest.33
These laws envision physicians as expert, unbiased purchasing
agents for individual inputs, rather than as key personnel in
organized systems of care.  Exceptions to fraud laws have been
created to accommodate situations in which physician organi-
zations offer integrated products, but these provisions are often
unrealistically prescriptive because product assembly remains
so atypical.34
Such a fragmented model of health care services bodes
poorly for competition: price, quality, choice, and even innova-
tion mean little if the product is incoherent.  The absurdity of
selling unassembled health care products has been parodied in
print and on YouTube.35  Among market participants, recogni-
tion of excessive fragmentation has rekindled interest in inte-
grated systems such as Kaiser-Permanente and the Geisinger
Health System and has motivated private and public insurers
to experiment with payment for “bundled, episodic care” deliv-
ered to patients with both acute and chronic illnesses.36  In
early 2015, the Secretary of Health and Human Services an-
nounced an ambitious goal of tying 90% of Medicare payments
to quality or value by 2018, with 50% governed by payment
arrangements other than fee-for-service.37  It has also been
healthcare-costs/ [https://perma.cc/5Q9T-E4SK] (citing 80% as a “frequently
used number” for the percentage of health care costs that is directed by
physicians).
33 TERRY S. COLEMAN, MEDICARE LAW 294–99 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the self-
referral system in Medicare).
34 See, e.g., JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22743, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS AFFECTING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW, 7–8 (2013)
(criticizing in-office exceptions to fraud law); see also James F. Blumstein, The
Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the
Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205 (1996) (pointing out that fraud
and abuse laws frequently penalize efficiency).
35 Jonathan Rauch, If Air Travel Worked Like Health Care, NAT’L J. (Sept. 25,
2009) (parodying health care system inefficiency); TheNewAltons, If Air Travel
Were Like Health Care, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=5J67xJKpB6c [http://perma.cc/B4KC-FKZU].
36 M. Susan Ridgely et al., Bundled Payment Fails to Gain a Foothold in
California: The Experience of the IHA Bundled Payment Demonstration, 33 HEALTH
AFF. 1345, 1352 (2014) (discussing California’s bundled care initiative).
37 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Better, Smarter,
Healthier: In Historic Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and Timeline for
Shifting Medicare Reimbursements from Volume to Value (Jan. 26, 2015), http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/01/20150126a.html [https://perma.cc/
6B8E-5KYV].
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noted by management theorists.  In his work on redesigning
primary care, for example, Harvard business professor Michael
Porter divides patients into subgroups for whom the core prod-
uct, not just its nominal price or general quality, differs based
on its value to that subgroup.38
Lack of product assembly has not, however, been incorpo-
rated into health care antitrust analysis or competition policy
more generally.39  It is true that professional services are less
likely to follow an assembly model, not only because of regula-
tory protectionism but also because—unlike physicians—pro-
fessionals such as lawyers and accountants still sell mainly
their personal time and effort.  Even these professions, how-
ever, tend to assemble their expertise, information resources,
and professional processes into units, which has opened them
up to competition from online, do-it-yourself companies such
as LegalZoom and TurboTax.40  Medical markets lag rather
than lead with respect to such developments,41 notwithstand-
ing the fact that health care is both more industrialized and
more expensive than other professional domains.
B. Regulatory Determinants of Faux Products
Why do medical markets systematically conflate process
steps, components, and inputs with products?  Health econo-
mist Sherry Glied distinguishes between traditional “medical-
ist” models of health care services and more recent “marketist”
models.42  Whereas classic economics regards the tradeoffs be-
tween cost and quality that individuals make in market trans-
actions as worthy of respect, “medicalists” reject market
preferences as a basis for health care decisions.43  Instead,
38 Michael E. Porter et al., Redesigning Primary Care: A Strategic Vision to
Improve Value by Organizing Around Patients’ Needs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 516, 525
(2013) (offering a framework to address primary care’s lack of infrastructure and
inability to attract new physicians); see generally MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH
OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE: CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON
RESULTS 97–98, 200–02 (2006) (reframing health care around integrated practice
units receiving value-based payment).
39 Various regulatory proposals for bundled payment exist, as well as private
bundled payment initiatives. See infra text accompanying notes 103–05, 122, R
140 (discussing bundled payment initiatives). R
40 When health care is sufficiently basic or standardized so that it does not
require assembly before purchase, chances are that it also can be accessed and
coordinated directly by the consumer, without reliance on a physician at all.
41 See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. R
42 SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 18–28 (1997)
(discussing different health care service models).
43 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 941–43 (1963).
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they assert that medical science determines a unique, correct
method of care, albeit one that requires customization based
on each patient’s specific clinical circumstances and exercise of
autonomy in consenting to treatment after being advised of its
risks.44  If medical need is determined by scientific objectivity,
then U.S. physicians—who are selected and trained to epito-
mize those qualities—can be trusted to apply their own skills
and to recruit outside resources in the correct quantities ad
hoc without prior assembly.
However, an openly market-based model of health care de-
livery would seem to compare favorably with the randomness
that actually exists.  Decades of data convincingly refute the
medicalist model as an accurate description of prevailing prac-
tice.  Since the 1970s, John Wennberg and others have docu-
mented the inconsistency of health care from place to place
across the United States (“small-area variation”), variability
that has no discernable relation to either the prevalence or
severity of illness or the outcomes of treatment.45
Care processes that meet scientific guidelines—so-called
evidence-based medicine—continue to be a goal of many health
care policy experts.46  Even if unjustified clinical variation
could be eliminated by enforcing guidelines, however, it would
still be necessary to produce each scientifically indicated ser-
vice at acceptable cost, both for paying customers and for those
who require public assistance.  Competition would seem im-
portant to this process, although countries with socialized
health care systems tend to rely on second-best strategies such
as controls on capital expenditures, global budgets, price-fix-
ing, and rationing.47
44 If medical care is dictated by science but individualized through physician
judgment and compassion, the process of care converges conceptually with its
outcome.  As economist Kenneth Arrow noted half a century ago, medicine can be
regarded as an “experience good” not capable of advance evaluation by consumers
because “the outcome of medical care cannot be separated from the process of
receiving it.” Id. at 941–47 (analyzing the operation of the health care industry
and the efficacy with which it satisfies the needs of society).
45 THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTHCARE, Understanding of the Efficiency and
Effectiveness of the Health Care System (2015), http://www.dartmouthatlas.org
[http://perma.cc/6ENP-ZDN6].
46 Harvey V. Fineberg, Foreword to MARK B. MCCLELLAN ET AL., INST. OF MED.,
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF HEALTHCARE: 2007 IOM
ANNUAL MEETING SUMMARY, at v (2008) (exploring evidence-based medicine as a
potential key driver toward greater value and efficiency in medical care).
47 See generally THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF HEALTH
CARE SYSTEMS, 2013 (Sarah Thomson et al. eds., 2013), http://www.common
wealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2013/Nov/1717
_Thomson_intl_profiles_hlt_care_sys_2013_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y73H-UJ9S]
(comparing countries with socialized health care systems).
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1. Physician Services
In the private system that prevails in the United States, the
medicalist model has been formalized through laws and norms
that institutionalize deference to physician expertise.  For over
a century, health care in the United States has been under the
direction of the American medical profession, which was
granted extraordinary privileges to define its exclusive domain
and to oversee its own clinical and economic conduct.48  At the
same time, physicians have been sheltered by law from both
private corporate control and explicit public governance.49
The unlicensed practice of medicine is prohibited by law in
every state, and the scope of practice for other professionals,
such as nurses and pharmacists, is strictly circumscribed,
often by physician-controlled state licensing boards.  Generous
subventions for medical education and training, as well as
costless access for physicians to technologically advanced hos-
pital resources, have fostered the growth of medical specialists
and further increased the economic and political influence of
the profession.50  Very little of the regulation adopted under
this “professional paradigm” directly promoted market compe-
tition;51 to the contrary, the activities of physicians only slowly
became subject to federal antitrust law as industry revenues
rose.52
48 Compared to unregulated markets, competition in health care therefore
relies more on physician-sellers’ fiduciary obligations of loyalty to patients, and
less on direct consumer voice and exit (choice). ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE
AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 1, 40,
63–65 (1970) (discussing alternative ways of reacting to deterioration in business
firms and dissatisfaction with organizations).  Accordingly, it is skewed toward
nonprice dimensions, while competition on price is often anemic.
49 STARR, supra note 25, at 13–24. R
50 See id. at 77–78 (discussing the role that industrialization has played in
incentivizing medical professionals to specialize).
51 James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical
Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1459, 1506 (1994) (examining the competing visions of medical care represented
by the professional paradigm and the market-based economic paradigm); Charles
D. Weller, Free Choice as a Restraint of Trade in American Health Care Delivery
and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1392 (1984) (characterizing the traditionally
fragmented health care system as “guild-free choice”).
52 Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Re-
sponse, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 939, 940–43, 953 (2001) (discussing anti-
trust law’s engagement with health care as a consequence of its rapid growth and
commercialization after government became a major purchaser).  Over fifty years
elapsed between the passage of the Sherman Act and its application to the Ameri-
can Medical Association’s overt exclusionary policies. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v.
United States, 317 U.S. 519, 530–36 (1943) (holding that a restraint of trade
could be evidenced by the fact that physicians and their medical societies con-
spired to exclude competing physicians affiliated with nontraditional methods of
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The effect of this history has been to equate health care
products with professional process steps.  As the technical ca-
pacity of medicine increased and health insurance grew com-
mon, each new process step became associated with a billing
code, most notably through the compendium of Current Proce-
dural Terminology (CPT) codes that the American Medical As-
sociation maintains (and copyrights).53  Using these codes,
health insurance reimburses physicians and other providers
for the costs associated with each process step, the term “reim-
bursement” conveying both the presumed nondiscretionary na-
ture of the steps taken and the primarily nonfinancial
motivation ascribed to the health professionals and nonprofit
institutions providing that care.54  Government payment poli-
cies, particularly under Medicare, have perpetuated this ap-
proach to health care products.55
Refinements in the fee-for-service approach to physician
payment have attempted to discern the true value of care by
paying fairly for each process step but have seldom questioned
the overall coherence of defining medical products in this fash-
ion.  The best example is Medicare’s shift in the early 1990s
from reimbursing “customary, prevailing, and reasonable” phy-
sician fees to using a resource-based relative value scale
(RBRVS) intended to capture the difficulty and expense of pro-
viding individual services.56  Medicare’s Relative Value Scale
Update Committee (RUC) even confers authority on the medical
profession to advise CMS regarding both what processes of care
should be represented in Medicare’s CPT-based physician fee
schedule and how much money physicians should receive for
financing from local societies and to refrain from referrals and consultations with
group practice physicians).  And it was not until well after the enactment of
Medicare that specific transactions involving health professionals became targets
for antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S.
332 (1982) (holding that maximum fee agreements among physicians constituted
price fixing and were per se unlawful).
53 AM. MED. ASS’N, CPT Coding, Medical Billing and Insurance (2014), http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-
practice/coding-billing-insurance.page? [http://perma.cc/K3V5-LQF9].
54 See Miriam J. Laugesen, Roy Wada & Eric M. Chen, In Setting Doctors’
Medicare Fees, CMS Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s
Advice on Work Values, 31 HEALTH AFF. 965, 968–70 (2012).
55 See generally Katharina Janus & Lawrence D. Brown, Medicare as Incuba-
tor for Innovation in Payment Policy, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (2007)
(noting the role of Medicare in shaping the U.S. healthcare system).
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engaging in them.57  Unsurprisingly, the RUC has proved a
formidable obstacle to reducing fees or requiring covered ser-
vices to be of demonstrable value to patients.58
2. Hospital-Based Services
The longstanding fragmentation of health care delivery
among both health professionals and health care facilities and
the lack of connection between those two critical sectors are
also largely the result of government regulation and payment
policies.  Even the inpatient services that continue to comprise
the largest portion (roughly 30%) of national health expendi-
tures are requisitioned by physicians but organized and deliv-
ered independently of them.59  Improved efficiency therefore
will require both new forms of payment and substantial
changes to hospital structures, including physician affiliation
and employment practices.
A major defect in medical product design is that inpatient
units of service are bifurcated into “professional” and “facility”
components, even though hospitalized patients generally re-
quire close coordination between professional skills and insti-
tutional resources.60  For example, a patient undergoing
surgery will be charged by the hospital for everything except
physician services, while the surgeons, anesthesiologist, and
surgical pathologist will each generate a separate invoice.  Both
private and public insurers typically process claims on this
basis.61  As a result, physicians and hospitals become nonex-
clusive coproducers of care within hospital walls.  Their ser-
vices are “complementary” but poorly integrated: the
physician’s contribution to patient care is not an input for the
hospital’s output, nor is the hospital’s contribution an input for
the physician’s output.
57 The RUC is composed of 31 physician members approved by the AMA, with
21 nominated by major national medical specialty societies. AM. MED. ASS’N, The
RVS Update Committee (2014), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/medi
care/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/the-rvs-update-committee.page
[http://perma.cc/FN3D-LAUC] (overview of RUC composition).
58 See Miriam J. Laugesen et al., In Setting Doctors’ Medicare Fees, CMS
Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s Advice on Work Values,
31 HEALTH AFF. 965, 968–70 (2012).
59 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Health Expenditures (2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/health-expenditures.htm [http://perma.cc/
PE8C-37L5].
60 See EINER ELHAUGE, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation
and How to Fix It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLU-
TIONS 1, 5 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010).
61 Id. at 9.
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Absent regulation, physicians and hospitals would have a
very different economic relationship.  Most American hospi-
tals—and nearly all of the most prominent institutions—are
chartered as nonprofit corporations under state law and are
exempt from federal and state taxation.62  Nonprofit hospitals
may seem like competitive businesses delivering patient care,
but their roots are as community resources and physicians’
workshops.63
Legal constraints on the profit-seeking behavior of
nonprofit hospitals have been a mixed blessing for U.S. health
policy.  Because charitable corporations reinvest revenues in
operations rather than paying them as profits to owners,
nonprofit hospitals have helped maintain access to unprofita-
ble services.64  At the same time, however, they have catered
excessively to the preferences of physicians on whom they de-
pend for admissions.65  Nonprofit hospitals have contributed
substantial amounts of uncompensated care, but they have
failed to avert far more massive inefficiencies in the production
of hospital services, the assurance of clinical quality and
62 AM. HOSP. ASS’N, AHA HOSPITAL STATISTICS: 2012 EDITION, at 12 (2012) (show-
ing that 2904 hospitals are nonprofit out of 4985 total in the United States).
Nonprofit hospitals must be organized and operated exclusively for charitable
purposes, may not distribute earnings to private parties, and must provide com-
munity benefit through activities such as serving the poor, maintaining an emer-
gency department, and allowing community physicians to join their medical
staffs.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).  Even so, many nonprofit hospitals are multibil-
lion dollar enterprises that wield significant economic and political influence.  In
recent years, community benefits and other indicia of nonprofit performance have
been made more tangible through detailed reporting requirements and, in a few
states, specified minimum dollar contributions.  Section 9007 of the ACA requires
tax-exempt hospitals to (i) conduct a community health needs assessment at least
once every three years; (ii) make financial assistance policies widely available; (iii)
comply with new billing and coding restrictions; and (iv) limit charges for emer-
gency or other medically necessary care.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 9007, 124 Stat. 855 (2010); see also James R. Hines,
Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1179, 1184–85 (2010) (describing the federal and state legal and tax require-
ments for nonprofit tax privileges).
63 The prohibition on private shareholding also implies that nonprofit hospi-
tals need only support current operations and repay long-term bondholders from
revenues in order to survive, and need not meet short-term earnings targets or
impress the public equity markets with rapid growth, as would be true of for-profit
hospitals.  This was intended to reinforce their charitable purposes, but it also
tends to make them complacent. ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH:
AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 40–46, 351–52 (1999) (voluntary
not-for-profit hospitals have been profit-maximizing enterprises, despite viewing
themselves as charities serving the community).
64 David W. Johnson & Nancy M. Kane, The U.S. Health Care System: A
Product of American History and Values, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF US HEALTH CARE:
CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 323, 339 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010).
65 Id. at 338–40.
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safety, and the coordination of care with other providers and
settings.66  Nonprofit hospitals have normalized the invention
and dissemination of expensive medical technologies, but they
have never taken money out of the health care system that
could be used more productively elsewhere, in either the public
or the private economy.67
U.S. hospitals typically have an open, self-governing medi-
cal staff through which physicians voluntarily affiliate them-
selves with the facility, earning “privileges” to admit and care
for patients through screening and ongoing evaluation by other
physicians performing peer review.68  The potential for estab-
lished competitors to disadvantage new entrants using peer-
review processes has long been recognized.69  More generally,
open medical staffs have enabled many physicians, particu-
larly specialists who cannot function without hospital re-
sources, to remain organizationally separated from, and
subject to different incentives than, the hospitals in which they
work and even from their physician colleagues within those
hospitals.70
66 Id. at 341.
67 Id. at 340.
68 Open medical staffs have been encouraged by state law, and for many
years helped nonprofit hospitals receive favorable federal tax treatment by serving
as evidence of charitable purpose. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Health Care Pro-
vider Reference Guide (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc04.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2Z48-Y74W] (federal tax guidance for health providers); see
also Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and
Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1384 (2003) (discussing
IRS guidelines encouraging open medical staff organization and governance);
John P. Marren, G. Landon Feazell & Michael W. Paddock, The Hospital Board at
Risk and the Need to Restructure the Relationship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws,
Peer Review and Related Solutions, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 226–28 (2003)
(discussing the current structure of U.S. hospital governance and hospital admin-
istrators/board members’ inability to overrule medical staff).  Medical staff self-
governance is also ingrained in the accreditation standards of the Joint Commis-
sion, compliance with which qualifies hospitals to participate in Medicare and
Medicaid. See THE JOINT COMMISSION, Medical Staff (CAMH/Hospitals) (Mar. 10,
2011), http://www.jointcommission.org/mobile/standards_information/jcfaqde
tails.aspx?StandardsFAQId=435&StandardsFAQChapterId=74 [http://perma.cc
/9DAB-LFZQ]; Benefits of Joint Commission Accreditation, JOINT COMMISSION (Aug.
28, 2015), http://www.jointcommission.org/benefits_of_joint_commission_ac
creditation/ [https://perma.cc/X3WR-ASA8].
69 See Philip C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the
Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 636–37 (1982) (analyzing potential
antitrust problems with medical staff self-governance leading to privilege denials
of other practitioners); see also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (holding
the state-action doctrine did not protect Oregon physicians from federal antitrust
liability for their activities on hospital peer-review committees).
70 Kissam et al., supra note 69, at 612–13. R
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This loose form of physician-hospital collaboration is com-
mon only in the United States and Canada.  In most other
developed countries, primary care physicians work exclusively
in their private offices or small clinics, and specialist physi-
cians are hospital employees.71  In the last few years, employ-
ment of physicians by hospitals has grown rapidly in states
that permit it.72  Because of decades of customary practice,
however, merely employing physicians has rarely induced hos-
pitals to create true “integrated practice units.”73  In several
states (including Texas and California), moreover, legal
prohibitions on the corporate practice of medicine continue to
restrict the direct employment of physicians by other entities,
making it even more difficult to coordinate the services of
health professionals and health care facilities.74
The cumulative effect of the regulatory environment has
been to disaggregate hospital care into the smallest possible
units of service, promote rapid adoption of new technologies
while freezing their prices at high initial levels, encourage hos-
pitals to incur reportable and therefore reimbursable costs,
and create an equally stylized set of “charges” of uncertain
relationship to reported costs.75  As a result, U.S. hospital
prices are shockingly high, variable, and arbitrary, recently
reaching a degree of irrationality and unfairness that has at-
tracted criticism not only from journalists but also from schol-
71 THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 47, at 13–14. R
72 See generally AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 62. R
73 See Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health
Care, 91 HARV. BUS. REV. 50 (2013) (listing integrated practice units as a core
component of value).
74 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2400, 2052 (West 2012) (regulations
providing that corporations cannot have professional licenses and requiring phy-
sicians to have a license in order to practice medicine); TEX. OCC. CODE. ANN.
§§ 155.001, 155.003, 157.001, 164.052, 165.156 (West 2012) (regulations on
physicians licensing and corporation’s ability to hire physicians); People v. Cole,
135 P.3d 669, 672 (Cal. 2006) (describing California law that bans corporate
practice of medicine); Flynn Bros., Inc. v. First Med. Assocs., 715 S.W.2d 782, 785
(Tex. App. 1986) (holding that a corporation of lay people is unlawfully practicing
medicine when it hires physicians to treat patients).  Other states have limited
exceptions for licensed hospitals. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6522 (McKinney 2006) (stat-
ute requiring physicians to have a license); People v. John H. Woodbury Dermato-
logical Inst., 85 N.E. 697, 698 (N.Y. 1908) (holding that specially licensed
hospitals were the only corporations with the authority to practice medicine).  In
1997, the Illinois Supreme Court clarified that licensed hospitals (but not other
corporations) could legally employ physicians.  Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln
Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 114 (Ill. 1997).
75 See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (Mar. 4,
2013).
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ars and regulators.76  This fact alone has serious adverse
consequences for market efficiency, which depends on honest
prices to convey granular information to both producers and
consumers about production options and their associated
costs.77  Moreover, hospitals have had little incentive to mea-
sure, much less attempt to reduce, the aggregate resource
costs of treating a patient for a particular condition, in large
part because hospital services are sold as physician-ordered
care components, not assembled services.78
Per-service hospital prices are poor predictors of overall
hospital spending because the volume of service—both the de-
cision to hospitalize and the intensity of treatment once hospi-
talized—typically remains under the discretionary authority of
physicians who are subject to a different set of financial and
nonfinancial incentives.  For example, control over per-service
prices without control over the volume of services delivered was
a recognized problem with Medicare’s RBRVS program from the
outset, justifying the inclusion of a Volume Performance Stan-
dard (VPS) or “behavioral offset” that automatically reduced
fees in response to unjustified increases in volume.79
Care is also poorly coordinated between different facilities
and with community-based sources of treatment.  “Post-acute”
services such as rehabilitation, for example, are currently a
major source of cost variability for the Medicare program.80
More broadly, efficient care delivery—and ultimately improved
health—requires most services to be accessible outside of the
76 See id.; see also Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 39–41 (criticizing hospital R
health care service prices); MASS. ATT’Y GEN.’S OFFICE, Examination of Health Care
Cost Trends and Cost Drivers, pursuant to G.L. c. 6D, § 8 1, 6–8 (2013) (analyzing
recent market developments and Massachusetts’s efforts to promote efficient and
effective delivery of health care).
77 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY 12–13 (1945)
(arguing that a centrally planned economy could never match the efficiency of an
open economy because of the dispersed nature of information spread throughout
society).
78 See Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 23. R
79 See John M. Eisenberg, Rethinking the Role of Health Care Providers: The
Physician’s Perspective, in IMPROVING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE: THE
PROVIDER PERSPECTIVE 22, 37 (1991).
80 David C. Grabowski et al., Medicare Postacute Care Payment Reforms Have
Potential to Improve Efficiency of Care, But May Need Changes to Cut Costs, 31
HEALTH AFF. 1941, 1947 (2012) (discussing the ACA’s potential to compromise the
delivery of patient-appropriate post-acute services).  A major goal of Medicare’s
new bundled payment program for joint replacement is to normalize postacute
spending. See Steven A. Farmer et al., Breaking Down Medicare’s Bold New
Proposal to Transform Hip and Knee Replacements, BROOKINGS (Aug. 11, 2015,
1:12 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/health360/posts/2015/08/joint-re
placement-model-care [http://perma.cc/YZM5-SMA7].
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hospital setting, both at reconfigured ambulatory care sites
and in more innovative locations such as retail stores, schools,
and workplaces.81
3. Insurance Assemblages
Over the last half century, the percentage of health care
costs paid directly by patients has diminished substantially,
while the amount paid through health insurance has in-
creased.82  For private health insurance markets, this growth
reflects the fact that serious illness can be an unpredictable
and expensive event, augmented by the scale economies and
tax subsidies associated with insurance coverage being offered
as a fringe benefit of employment.  For public insurance pro-
grams such as Medicare and Medicaid, growth represents a
combination of social solidarity for the elderly regardless of
income and redistributive commitments to groups of lower-
income individuals deemed deserving of assistance.83
Critics of health insurance often attribute overuse of ser-
vices and general price insensitivity within the health care sys-
tem to the moral hazard inherent in third-party payment.84
However, health insurance also perpetuates false products by
aggregating professional process steps and other traditional
care components and inputs into assemblages that appear co-
herent but remain disconnected from the efficient solution of
complex medical problems.85
81 See Cynthia Napier Rosenberg et al., Results from a Patient-Centered Medi-
cal Home Pilot at UPMC Health Plan Hold Lessons for Broader Adoption of the
Model, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2423, 2423–24 (2012) (describing the innovative delivery of
health care through patient-centered medical homes); William M. Sage, Out of the
Box: The Future of Retail Medical Clinics, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 4–6
(2009) (discussing the potential efficiencies of retail medical clinics).
82 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., National Health Expenditures 2013
Highlights (2013), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/high
lights.pdf [http://perma.cc/KJC2-NLBQ] (reporting national health care costs for
2013).
83 See Theodore R. Marmor, American Health Care Policy and Politics: Is Frag-
mentation a Helpful Category for Understanding Health Reform Experience and
Prospects?, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 343,
356 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010); David M. Cutler & Jonathan Gruber, The Effect of
Medicaid Expansions on Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and Redistribution,
86 HEALTH ECON. 378, 379 (1996).
84 D. ANDREW AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40834, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 18–19 (2010);
Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance, 103 AM. ECON.
REV. 178, 217 (2013) (discussing health insurance moral hazards and causes).
85 See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Reed Abelson, Medicare Bills Rise for Stents Put
into Limbs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2015, at A1 (questioning Medicare payment to
cardiologists for peripheral arterial stents).
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Modern health insurance in the United States began with
Blue Cross, which was a collective endeavor by hospitals to
assure themselves of payment during the Great Depression by
offering their communities a way to prepay for services if
needed.86  Physicians came up with a related strategy, Blue
Shield, setting the tone for partitioning institutional and pro-
fessional services within insurance coverage.87  When Medicare
was enacted in 1965, it replicated this structure by creating a
compulsory social insurance system to cover hospitals and
other facilities (Part A) and a separate, voluntary but subsi-
dized premium system to cover care by physicians and other
health professionals (Part B).88  Separating hospital from phy-
sician coverage in Medicare using constructs familiar from pri-
vate indemnity insurance both blunted organized medicine’s
opposition to “socialized medicine” and allayed its fear of corpo-
rate control.89
Supported by state and federal law, most private and pub-
lic health insurance policies still employ this piecemeal ap-
proach to benefit design, typically adding more categories of
covered services that are merely care components or inputs,
such as diagnostic testing, prescription drugs, and durable
medical equipment.90  Within each category, coverage may still
be denied if a service is not “medically necessary,”91 but deter-
minations of medical necessity are linked to claims, and claims
are almost always for unassembled products.92
Taking a longer view of health care markets, moreover,
commercial insurers act as purchasing intermediaries, not ac-
tual consumers of health care.  At best, they are weak agents
for buyers; at worst, they are self-interested middlemen.  They
86 Alex Blumberg & Adam Davidson, Accidents of History Created U.S. Health
System, NPR (2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11
4045132 [https://perma.cc/P635-VERJ] (detailing creation of Blue Cross health
insurance as a consequence of historical events).
87 Marc Lichtenstein, Health Insurance from Invention to Innovation: A History
of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD BLOG
(2015), http://www.bcbs.com/blog/health-insurance.html#.VfYwHdNViko [http:
//perma.cc/6FTB-89GL].
88 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., History (2014), http://www.cms.
gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/index.html?redirect=/history/
[http://perma.cc/7HX9-K8EE].
89 Shawn Martin, Medicare and Medicaid: ‘Doing the Right Thing for Those in
Need,’ AAFP: IN THE TRENCHES (June 23, 2015), http://blogs.aafp.org/cfr/inthe
trenches/entry/medicare_and_medicaid_doing_the [http://perma.cc/ZM2Y-
LPXN].
90 Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medi-
cal Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1647 n.31 (1992).
91 Id.
92 See id. at 1666–68.
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turn a respectable profit and have every reason to maintain
their existing market role and business practices.  Many are
for-profit organizations facing limited competitive pressure.93
Whether to comply with regulation, reduce potential legal lia-
bility, or simply avoid controversy, insurers tend to refrain from
directly influencing clinical care and focus their attention on
negotiating fees for conventional services.94
Inertia and such perverse incentives make it unlikely that
private insurers will convert their covered benefits from assem-
blages of process steps into assembled products anytime soon.
Much of their business is not even true insurance with risk of
loss, in that many insurers administer coverage for self-in-
sured employers or base their premiums on highly predictable
annual group experience.95  Most health insurers earn revenue
primarily by processing claims involving large networks of par-
ticipating providers that also contract with rival companies or
by doing similar tasks as subcontractors for Medicare.96  Con-
sequently, they have little cause to decrease the volume of
claims by moving from reimbursable process steps to assem-
bled products, a transition that would also force them to revisit
the basic structure of their benefits.  To the contrary, offering
seemingly comprehensive coverage of faux products through
inclusive networks of hospitals and physicians discourages
competition from other insurers, while (falsely) reassuring reg-
ulators that policyholders are not receiving less than they con-
tracted to receive.
In addition to separating physician from hospital coverage,
Medicare as enacted in 1965 included several features in-
tended to gain critical support from organized medicine.97
These compromises further subsidized trade in unassembled
products: a pledge of noninterference with existing medical
practice, repayment of hospitals’ reported costs plus a reasona-
ble profit margin and capital cost allowance, payment of physi-
cians’ “customary and prevailing” fees, and claims
93 Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 54–55. R
94 See ELHAUGE, supra note 60, at 9; Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Re- R
straints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 338 (1978).
95 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 34, at 23–25. R
96 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OSI-99-7, IMPROPRIETIES BY CONTRAC-
TORS COMPRISED MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY (1999) (analyzing whether Medicare
contractors participated in any improper or questionable practices that contrib-
uted to fraud, waste, or abuse in the Medicare federal health insurance program).
Serving government programs more profitably seems to be a motivator of recent
health insurance merger activity. See Pear, infra note 131. R
97 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(1965).
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administration by familiar private organizations (mainly Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans)98 rather than a government
agency.99  Although most of these characteristics have been
modified, they set a tone for public coverage in the United
States that was deferential to private practice and welcoming of
entrepreneurial investment but undemanding with respect to
competitive outcomes.
Public funding generally comes with strings attached, and
Medicare and Medicaid are replete with conditions of participa-
tion, payment specifications, and associated procedures and
prohibitions.  Beginning as early as 1972, for example, Con-
gress set in motion a series of increasingly strict penalties for
“fraud and abuse.”100  Unfortunately, the broad restrictions on
financial transactions imposed by these laws have served as
much to deter potentially efficient contractual affiliations be-
tween physicians and hospitals as to reduce unnecessary
care.101  Because hospitals design their clinical and financial
workflow primarily to comply with the rules and respond to the
incentives established by Medicare and Medicaid, and private
payers routinely adopt standards and practices based on gov-
ernment benchmarks, this additional disincentive to product
assembly spilled over to the private insurance marketplace as
well.
C. Advantages of Assembled Products
In the vast majority of commercial markets, competition
reduces price, increases timeliness of access or use, and im-
proves performance.  Although those goals are mainstays of
industrial engineering, health care markets have typically re-
garded such pedestrian objectives with disdain or embarrass-
ment.102  Competition policy needs to overcome this resistance
98 See Rick Mayes, The Origins, Development, and Passage of Medicare’s Rev-
olutionary Prospective Payment System, 62 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 21, 23–24
(2007).
99 79 Stat. at 291, 309–11, 322–23.
100 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2012); see also Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b) (2012) (prohibiting the exchange, or offer of exchange, of any remu-
neration to reward, or induce, referrals of business for federal health care pro-
grams, including Medicare and Medicaid).
101 James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health
Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 224
(1996) (discussing inconsistencies between fraud law and market need).
102 See, e.g., Susan Dentzer, It’s Past Time to Get Serious About Transforming
Care, 32 HEALTH AFF. 6, 6 (2013) (“One eternal mystery of US health care is why
patients and payers have been loath to demand attributes they take for granted in
other sectors of the economy, such as convenience, price transparency, and rea-
sonable costs.”).
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and restore normalcy to the first-pass criteria for what makes a
health care product “better.”  From this perspective, selling
more health care products on a fully assembled basis has sub-
stantial advantages.
A range of assembled products can be designed to meet
clinical need and consumer demand, but they are not explicitly
distinguished in the health policy literature from their less co-
hesive counterparts based on the effectiveness of the competi-
tion that they are capable of generating.103  Assembled
products offering definitive care for an acute problem (e.g., joint
replacement, coronary artery bypass grafting) might include all
professional services, facility use, and medical supplies, plus
standard rehabilitative care, and might come with a warranty
to cover treatment failure or complications.  Patients with
chronic disease might purchase a year of maintenance therapy
and secondary prevention.  Assembled diagnostic services
might range from an examination with explanation and reas-
surance, to a single scan for follow-up of a known condition, to
a full work-up for grave or unusual symptoms.
Several assembled products exist today, such as simple
diagnostics and definitive treatments for minor illnesses and
injuries.104  Others are being developed, such as all-inclusive
treatment for cardiac conditions, orthopedic problems, or
cancers, and packaged maintenance therapy for chronic dis-
eases.105  Medical tourism often involves assembled prod-
ucts.106  Even end-of-life care can be thought of in terms of
assembled products, as the hospice industry demonstrates.107
1. Price and Convenience
Prices should be known to individual buyers in advance,
should be transparent to buyers as a group, and should tend to
103 See, e.g., Porter et al., supra note 38, at 521–22 (suggesting that bundled R
payments may result in better value for patients).
104 See William M. Sage & Kelley McIlhattan, Upstream Health Law, 42 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 535, 540–41 (2014).
105 See Terry Shih et al., Will Bundled Payments Change Health Care?: Exam-
ining the Evidence Thus Far in Cardiovascular Care, 131 CIRCULATION 2151, 2152,
2154 (2015); Cheryl Clark, CMS Announces Bundled Care Payments for Oncology,
HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Feb. 16, 2015), http://healthleadersmedia.com/content/
QUA-313227/CMS-Announces-Bundled–Care-Payments-for-Oncology [http://
perma.cc/RBV7-8F2C].
106 See DEVON M. HERRICK, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, MEDICAL TOURISM:
GLOBAL COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE 4 (2007).
107 MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HOSPICE
PAYMENT SYSTEM: PAYMENT SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES 4 (2013).
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the uniform (i.e., not be highly variable or discriminatory).108  If
sellers cannot compete on price, it is a clue that the product is
wrong.  In the health care system, accurate prices are often
unavailable because assembly is done piecemeal as charges
accrue.
When health care products are unassembled and disorga-
nized, moreover, it is difficult to determine and reduce the cost
of producing them.  For example, a large amount of waste oc-
curs within hospitals in connection with the treatment of seri-
ous illness, in part because facilities that are paid for
disaggregated units of service tend to be much better attuned
to their revenue streams than to their cost structures.109  Pro-
duction models for facility-based care also typically place phy-
sicians in independent, loosely supervisory roles rather than as
part of integrated and experienced teams.110
Health care is seldom convenient even when it is afforda-
ble.  The inconvenience of accessing care in most instances,
despite the enormous private and social resources devoted to
it, is another indication that it is being delivered in arbitrary
increments rather than being packaged into service units that
correspond to patient benefit.  Convenience is also a proxy for
innovation given the many barriers to entry by new competitors
that result from strong traditions of physician control and as-
sociated professional regulation.111
Consider products that might improve underlying health.
Americans are far less healthy than our wealth suggests we
should be.112  Empowering markets to redesign health care as
they do other consumer goods would distribute both basic
medical care and health-protective services widely across com-
108 Since the 1990s, policymakers and researchers have worked energetically
toward measurable, transparent quality of care. See, e.g., About Us, NAT’L QUALITY
F. (2015), http://www.qualityforum.org/story/About_Us.aspx [http://perma.cc/
Z94Z-5M4P].  These efforts, while laudatory, largely presuppose a tradeoff be-
tween price and quality that has seldom characterized the health care system in
operation.  Quality metrics help improve health outcomes, but by taking the
longer view it is hard to escape the conclusion that competition over quality
cannot occur unless price competition is also vigorous.
109 See Blumstein, supra note 34, at 206. R
110 See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE. ANN. § 157.054 (West 2012).
111 See Blumstein, supra note 51, at 1465–66. R
112 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 2014:
HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES COMPARE? (2014), http://www.oecd.org/united-
states/Briefing-Note-UNITED-STATES-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/C757-CDZ5]
(data comparing the health of U.S. citizens to other countries); see also Barbara
Starfield, Commentary, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 483, 483 (2000) (discussing information concerning the deficiencies of
U.S. medical care).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 28 16-MAR-16 15:47
636 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:609
munities and embed them in the daily, routine activities of
people who need not be labeled as “patients” in order to be
served.113  Competition for these services would promote per-
sonal engagement with health on the part of the consumer-
patient (e.g., through smartphones) and less expensive, more
accessible one-on-one care relationships.  Whereas assembled
products delivering acute or complex care would likely remain
covered by health insurance, consumer choice regarding basic
care and health promotion could be more flexible, with a larger
range of professional and nonprofessional skills and service
settings, and with less insurance involved.
2. Performance and Safety
Assembled products usually work.  By contrast, many
health care services provided in this country do not meet pa-
tients’ needs.  The Institute of Medicine’s estimated $750 bil-
lion in annual waste included $210 billion for unnecessary
services and $130 billion for inefficiently delivered, sometimes
harmful, services.114  A priority for health care competition is to
generate products and services that do people clear good and
are priced accordingly.
If each product is delivered assembled, it is easier to war-
rant against additional cost if there are safety lapses or if re-
sults stray from the expected.115  Warranties have been
underused in health care, in large part because lack of product
assembly vested physicians with legal liability for failings at-
tributable to their own negligence but denied any single party
financial or operational control over quality.116  In recent years,
a few integrated health care organizations have begun to offer
113 See Sage & McIlhattan, supra note 104, at 535 (defining the “upstream” as R
where the label of “patient” has not yet attached).
114 INST. OF MED., supra note 21, at 102. R
115 For example, many providers of in vitro fertilization offer substantial re-
funds if a live birth does not occur. See Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 115, 115 (2010) (noting that the way in which fertility treatments are
financed is virtually unparalleled in other areas of medicine).  As this example
suggests, quality warranties for products covered by health insurance and for
self-paid products are likely to differ.
116 In the 1990s, expectations that fully integrated HMOs would control both
cost and quality produced recommendations for both warranties and “enterprise
liability” for medical malpractice.  William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the
Emerging Managed Health Care System, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 166–67
(1997) (recommending enterprise liability); see William S. Brewbaker III, Medical
Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The Implied Warranty of Quality, 60
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 118 (1997) (recommending warranties).  In operation,
however, managed care seldom possessed attributes compatible with those ap-
proaches. See infra text accompanying notes 142–68. R
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packaged treatment for a preset price that includes additional
care when necessary.117  This trend should continue as Medi-
care shifts more covered services to bundled payment.
In addition to enabling outcomes of care to become more
reliable, competition in assembled products can make patients
safer while they receive care.  Uncertainty is part of medicine,
but many processes of care are controllable.  System failure
rather than individual malfeasance is the root cause of most
medical errors,118 and a standardized practice environment
with efficient coordination and teamwork is likely to be safer as
well as cheaper.119  The process of keeping patients safe is
considerably simpler when the extent of care is determined in
advance and sold as a package.120  Offering a coherent package
of services also makes the task of communicating residual
risks of treatment failure or physical harm more straightfor-
ward (e.g., in the course of obtaining informed consent).121
Finally, it is important to explain what a move to assem-
bled products is not.  First, it is not a request for a new govern-
ment-sponsored compendium of service units that replaces old
compendia such as relative value units, CPT codes, or Diagno-
sis Related Groups (DRGs).122  A central thesis of this Article is
that markets will supply such products if the regulatory barri-
ers to doing so are removed and if antitrust enforcers are alert
to private anticompetitive activity that preserves the status
quo.  Second, support for assembled products is not an en-
dorsement of “cookbook medicine.”123  Many medical problems
117 Geisinger Health Plan is one example, though a less dramatic one than has
been suggested. See supra note 36 and infra note 405 and accompanying text. R
118 INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 65 (Linda
T. et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter “TO ERR IS HUMAN”].
119 See INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 83 (2001) (arguing for increased cooperation between clini-
cians); TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 118, at 37 (suggesting that emergency depart- R
ments can decrease adverse events by increasing teamwork and standardizing
procedures).
120 Cf. TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 118, at 36–37 (noting poor systems cause R
more errors).
121 See generally JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 212–17 (2d ed. 2001) (summarizing contemporary informed
consent).
122 Medicare’s new joint replacement bundles, for example, serve as complex
retrospective adjustments to existing payment formulas rather than straightfor-
ward invitations to provide integrated care for a flat fee. See Robert E. Mechanic,
Mandatory Medicare Bundled Payment—Is It Ready for Prime Time?, 373 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1291 (2015) (explaining the details of the Medicare proposal).
123 Marshall B. Kapp, Commentary, ‘Cookbook Medicine’: A Legal Perspective,
150 JAMA ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 496, 499 (1990) (noting a move toward the use
of formalized clinical practice guidelines).
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require expert judgment and discretion.  That products be of-
fered in assembled form is entirely compatible with customiza-
tion; assembly merely implies that significantly different
clinical needs be properly categorized in advance of sale.  Third,
assembled products do not represent a frontal assault on pro-
fessional ethics.  Competition policymakers should be skeptical
about infusing economic relationships with too much moral
content; naı̈ve subsidies for medical professionalism have con-
tributed significantly to the flaws in existing health care prod-
ucts. Well-trained, compassionate people delivering assembled
health care products will continue to view the relief of human
suffering as their primary duty.  But they will pursue this mis-
sion with more effective teamwork, clearer accountability, and
less waste.
II
THE ANTITRUST LEGACY OF FAUX PRODUCTS
To understand competition policy today, it is necessary to
go back one generation of health care reform.  Health care prov-
iders appear to be experiencing a wave of consolidation last
seen in the early 1990s.124  After taking office in January 1993,
President Clinton conducted an intensive exercise in policy de-
velopment within the executive branch, leading to the intro-
duction in Congress later that year of a bill expanding health
insurance coverage.125  The Clinton Administration’s health re-
form bill shared with President Nixon’s earlier proposal a man-
date on private employers to offer health coverage and a
preference for “managed competition” among private health
maintenance organizations over a single-payer approach.126
As the economy revived and health security became a less
pressing concern for working Americans, however, public opin-
ion turned against the bill, which came to be viewed as threat-
ening jobs, compromising individual choice, and interposing
124 See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A




125 Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong. (1994); see generally Wendy
K. Mariner, Patients’ Rights to Care under Clinton’s Health Security Act: The Struc-
ture of Reform, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1330, 1330–31 (1994) (discussing the
history of the Health Security Act).
126 Mariner, supra note 125, at 1331; see infra notes 207–09 (explaining man- R
aged competition).
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bureaucratic obstacles to care.127  The bill’s defeat, and the
related shift of Congress to Republican control in 1994, ceded
the field to private employers and health plan administrators to
control costs themselves.128  This led to a rapid, nationwide
transition to a managed care model that actively involved
health insurers in delivering medical care, typically based on
contracts with physicians, hospitals, and other health care
providers.129
Antitrust law played an important role in how health care
markets developed following the Clinton reform proposal, and
it is likely to do the same today under the ACA.  Both efforts
promised sweeping legislation that would induce major
changes to the health care industry.130  Then as now, many
market participants worried that the restructuring necessary
to succeed in a reformed system might subject them to anti-
trust liability, and they asked the enforcement agencies for
clarification and hopefully reassurance.131  Others circled the
wagons intending to insulate their organizations from change,
which sometimes forced the agencies to investigate and re-
spond.132  Both the Clinton proposal and the ACA also pro-
voked a popular backlash, which was sufficiently strong in the
former case to prevent the bill’s passage.133  The result in the
1990s was market restructuring undisciplined by a consistent
or comprehensive regulatory framework.134  Whether today’s
opposition to “Obamacare” leads to a similar situation remains
to be seen.
Although a wide range of potentially anticompetitive prac-
tices are subject to the antitrust laws, corporate mergers and
acquisitions that reduce the number of independent competi-
127 See Elizabeth McCaughey, No Exit, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 7, 1994), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/health-care/no-exit [http://perma.cc/DHY3-
M9Y2] (criticizing the Health Security Act and suggesting “alternatives [could]
provide urgently needed reform of the health insurance industry, outlawing its
worst abuses, without taking important decisions away from patients and their
doctors and without depriving Americans of effective, high-tech medical care
when they are seriously ill”).
128 See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1703–04 (1999).
129 See id.
130 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148,
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 173 (2010); Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong. (1994).
131 See Thomas Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust Law and Physi-
cian Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189, 205–06 (2007); Robert Pear, As
Health Law Spurs Mergers, Risks Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2010, at A1, A23.
132 See Greaney, supra note 131, at 217; Pear, supra note 131. R
133 See William M. Sage, Commentary, Putting Insurance Reform in the ACA’s
Rear-View Mirror, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1104–05 (2014).
134 See Sage, supra note 128. R
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tors tend to be the most visible and controversial transac-
tions.135  Scrutiny of proposed mergers and acquisitions is an
important aspect of antitrust enforcement because U.S. law is
limited in its capacity to correct problems once market power
exists.136  At the same time, merger cases illustrate the path
dependence of today’s insured health care markets, highlight
the constitutive role of government, and demonstrate the
hazards of basing competition policy on historical rather than
forward-looking assumptions about health care products.137
Integration, bundled and episodic payment, and accounta-
bility for outcomes through both financial incentives and better
information are now widely discussed and expected among
policymakers and the educated public.138  Yet antitrust en-
forcement continues to analyze many interactions involving
commercial health insurers and hospitals as simple negotia-
tions between buyers and sellers to purchase medical services
at agreed upon, “discounted” fees for unassembled prod-
ucts.139  That model narrowly reflects the contracting practices
of the late 1990s and 2000s, a period devoid of major regula-
tory innovation, and disregards the direction being set for both
public and private health insurance under the ACA.140  Taking
a longer view, continually rising health care expenditures and
persistent shortcomings in quality and safety suggest that
many health insurers and providers have been engaged in
Kabuki theatre involving faux products that simulates hard-
nosed bargaining but fails to demand or deliver value for
money, and that not infrequently erects barriers to competitive
entry and innovation.
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012) (detailing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provement Act’s premerger notification requirements).
136 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Consolidation, and the Conse-
quent Impact on Competition in Health Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law, 113th Cong. 93–96 (2013)
(statement of Thomas L. Greaney, Chester A. Myers Professor of Law, St. Louis
University School of Law).
137 See infra subpart II.B.
138 See infra text accompanying notes 338–65. R
139 See infra subpart II.C.
140 See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text; see also Bruce Jaspen, R
Though Obamacare Pays Less, Providers Flock to ‘Bundled’ Medicare Payments,
FORBES (Feb. 1, 2013, 8:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/
2013/02/01/though-obamacare-pays-less-medical-providers-flock-to-bundled-
medicare-payments/ [http://perma.cc/S36E-GUSE] (explaining how under the
ACA many hospitals are moving away from the traditional fee-for-service model
towards “bundled” payments).
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A. Managed Care and Insurer-Provider Contracting
The political failure of the Clinton administration’s Health
Security Act in 1994 led government to abandon its leadership
position on health care reform and opened an opportunity for
private managed care organizations to fill the vacuum.  This
“managed care revolution” claimed authority to address seri-
ous problems with the cost-effectiveness and quality of health
care that researchers and policy experts had by then identi-
fied.141  Operating primarily through selective contracting to
create tightly controlled networks of providers, managed care
organizations instituted aggressive cost containment strategies
such as preauthorization requirements for hospital admission
and surgical procedures, concurrent review of the necessity of
continued hospitalization, mandatory referrals from primary
care physician “gatekeepers” to access specialty care, and al-
ternatives to fee-for-service payment (e.g., capitation, with-
holds) to induce physicians to reduce utilization of services.142
Prepaid health plans had a long history in the U.S. health
care system by the 1990s, but their role was often a marginal
one because of organized opposition from American physi-
cians.143  Beginning with the Nixon administration, however,
HMOs such as Kaiser-Permanente (from President Nixon’s
home state of California) became models for national health
reform.144  Many of these organizations also had visionary phy-
sician leadership capable of both articulating and operational-
izing more cost-effective approaches to care emphasizing
disease prevention.  Indeed, Kaiser-like HMOs sell an assem-
bled, comprehensive insurance product to consumers on a
fully budgeted basis.145  They manage their costs holistically146
141 See FIELD, supra note 13, at 38–44. R
142 Capitation is a contracted rate paid in advance to the physician per as-
signed patient, regardless of the number or nature of health care services pro-
vided. See Patrick C. Alguire, Understanding Capitation, AM. COLL. PHYSICIANS
(2014), http://www.acponline.org/residents_fellows/career_counseling/under
standcapit.htm [http://perma.cc/T9JM-YACR].
143 See STARR, supra note 25, at 301–06.  The first criminal prosecution of R
health care providers under the Sherman Act involved a physician boycott of a
prepaid health plan in Washington, D.C. See AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519
(1943).
144 See generally DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER:
HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 227 (2009) (reviewing health policy and the
presidency).  To both moderate Republicans and the centrist Democrats who suc-
ceeded them, “managed competition” among private health plans of the Kaiser
variety seemed a promising free-enterprise alternative to European-style single-
payer systems.
145 See PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 191–96 (7th ed. 2012).
146 See id.
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and may not even track the “reimbursable claims” so beloved
by non-HMO commercial insurers and health care providers.
On the other hand, HMOs of this type are difficult to launch
where they do not already exist, and a geographic market that
consists only of such large organizations will almost certainly
be concentrated in antitrust terms.
From the perspective of acute care hospitals, managed care
in the 1990s was an additional source of financial pressure
that prompted the deployment of various business strategies,
including the affiliation of previously independent hospitals
into larger systems that could share management, reduce the
number of governing boards, market themselves more effec-
tively, pursue economies of scale, and engage in group
purchasing of supplies.147  Undoubtedly, many transactions
were intended to improve hospitals’ economic clout, but most
of them, given the mood of the time, were undertaken as adap-
tive strategies rather than exploitative ones.148  For the first
time since the 1960s, for-profit hospitals were again major
market participants, putting the larger, more established com-
munity hospitals on the defensive.149  Several nonprofit Blue
Cross plans and a few prominent nonprofit hospitals converted
to for-profit status also, and a variety of entrepreneurial in-
termediaries entered the fray, sensing the upside potential
from showing rapid revenue growth during a stock market
boom.150  Even Columbia-HCA and the other for-profit hospital
mega-chains were motivated by things besides market power,
primarily capturing investors and increasing share value
through rapid growth.151
147 See AMERINGER, supra note 28, at 156–57. R
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 156–59.
151 Columbia-HCA, which became the largest hospital company in the United
States, started its rapid expansion by acquiring panicked facilities in over-bedded
markets, but it eventually turned to fraudulent billing and accounting practices
and shady arrangements with referring physicians. See Jeff Goldsmith, Colum-
bia/HCA: A Failure of Leadership, 17 HEALTH AFF. 27–29 (1998).  One can tell a
similar story about physician services during this period, emphasizing physician-
hospital organizations that were launched to contract jointly with insurers, defen-
sive efforts by hospitals to acquire primary care practices and assure patient
referrals, and for-profit physician practice management companies seeking to
impress Wall Street. See David Hemenway et al., Physicians’ Responses to Finan-
cial Incentives: Evidence from a For-Profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEW ENG.
J. MEDICINE 1059, 1059–63 (1990) (analyzing Health Stop, a for-profit ambulatory
management company, which utilized financial incentives for physicians to in-
crease revenues); Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ
Physicians—The Logic behind a Money-Losing Proposition, NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE
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Managed care, however, found it harder than expected to
alter clinical behavior in a system so committed to unassem-
bled products, so thoroughly rooted in physician control, and
so devoid of objective accountability.  Most managed care orga-
nizations did not attempt to reconfigure health care directly but
instead tried to reset the health care system’s financial incen-
tives by shifting the financial risk of overutilizing services from
insurers to providers.152  The centerpiece of this effort, physi-
cian capitation, proved particularly difficult to implement.153
In a health care system accustomed to piecemeal payment for
unassembled products, physicians who had learned to keep
their appointment books full and to churn patients through
RVUs were challenged to distinguish essential from nonessen-
tial care.154  Even physicians who could manage their own care
processes effectively were neither organizationally nor finan-
cially prepared to assume responsibility for all the inputs that
they had previously “ordered” on someone else’s account.155
A regulatory backlash further discouraged managed care
from radically remaking American medicine.  The general pub-
lic had no interest in allowing “evil HMOs” to tell their doctors
what to do (and, more importantly, what not to do) should they
become seriously ill, while a general economic recovery took
some of the pressure off cost containment as a consumer con-
cern.156  Congress and state legislatures responded to popular
fears through regressive legislation that restricted the tools of
managed care.157  Denominated “patient protection acts,”
these laws mainly sheltered physicians and hospitals from
competitive pressure.158  Several states even adopted “any
willing provider” or “freedom of choice” laws, which limited the
ability of managed care organizations to develop and manage
narrow provider networks.159
1790, 1790–91 (2011) (explaining that hospitals in the 1990s acquired primary
care practices to assure patient referrals to their respective hospitals).
152 See FELDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 192–93; Samuel H. Zuvekas & Joel W. R
Cohen, Paying Physicians by Capitation: Is the Past Now Prologue?, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 1661, 1661 (2010).
153 See Zuvekas & Cohen, supra note 152, at 1666 (describing the history of R
physician capitation in the 1980s and 1990s and its failure).
154 See generally FELDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 194–96 (explaining the benefits R
and drawbacks of physician capitation payments).
155 See id.
156 AMERINGER, supra note 28, at 177–84. R
157 See id. at 180–81.
158 See id. at 173–74.
159 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407 (West 2008) (“No hospital, physician
or type of provider . . . willing to meet the terms and conditions offered to it or him
shall be excluded.”); ALA. CODE § 27-45-3 (1988) (“No health insurance policy or
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Once managed care was hamstrung, insurers retreated to
business strategies that aroused less public controversy than a
frontal assault on wasteful treatment.  Rather than be seen as
limiting choice and rationing care, for example, health insurers
began signing contracts with all the hospitals (and nearly all
the physicians) in each community and negotiated “dis-
counted” rates for their services.160  Blue Cross plans—the
Oldsmobiles of health insurance—were suddenly back “in”;
highly selective HMOs were “out.”161  Large hospitals, many of
which had been considered moribund or at least fungible in a
managed care world focused on prevention and ambulatory
care, found themselves again in control, outpacing both insur-
ers and physicians in both organizational strength and finan-
cial wherewithal.162  Private employers who sponsored health
coverage were appeased by shifting more costs to beneficiaries,
which proved easier (and less visible) than actually managing
care.163
What remained after the political dust settled was a faux-
competitive market in which each private insurer negotiated
fees with every hospital and nearly every physician in their
geographic regions but did little else to reduce cost or improve
quality.  Correspondingly, the main goal of providers became to
hold their own in these negotiations.  Criticizing this minimally
managed style of managed care, one physician-health policy
expert quoted ironically from a letter he had recently received
from a California health insurer, welcoming him to its “care-
fully selected panel of more than 300 hospitals and 21,000
physicians.”164  These broad, overlapping networks of provid-
ers agreed to accept specified prices for unassembled services,
or to make percentage concessions from reportedly standard
charges that nobody actually paid.165  A hospital admission
employee benefit plan . . . shall . . . [p]revent any person who is a party to or
beneficiary of any such health insurance policy or employee benefit plan from
selecting the pharmacy or pharmacist of his choice . . . .”).  For a discussion of the
evolution of “any willing provider” and “freedom of choice” laws, see Fred J. Hel-
linger, Any-Willing-Provider and Freedom-of-Choice Laws: An Economic Assess-
ment, 14 HEALTH AFF. 297 (1995).
160 See discussion infra subsection III.B.1(d).
161 See FELDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 207–08. R
162 See id. at 301–02.
163 See id. at 190–91.
164 Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition, 16 HEALTH AFF. 171, 176 (1997)
(“The alignment between health plans and providers envisioned in managed com-
petition is virtually impossible.”).
165 Lisa Kinney Helvin, Note, Caring for the Uninsured: Are Not-for-Profit Hospi-
tals Doing Their Share?, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 423–24 (2008) (noting
that hospitals often charge the poorest patients the highest rates for services).
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remained a “blank check” experience, with insurers paying
heavily discounted rates for a seemingly endless list of arbitrar-
ily priced items appearing on the final bill and patients bearing
significant residual costs.166
By the turn of the millennium, contractual bargaining over
discounted fees was the principal accomplishment that the
managed care industry could trumpet to a still skeptical pub-
lic.  Contracts for disaggregated hospital services give insurers
somewhat greater predictability regarding cost than would in-
demnity reimbursement, but they do little to promote efficiency
in care delivery.  Although proponents of managed care contin-
ued to tout its potential benefits, the poster children for its
success were HMOs such as Kaiser with shared values, stable
patient populations, and solid capital assets—attributes not
easily exported or grown to scale elsewhere.167  All in all, this
was a disappointing end to a decade that had begun with high
hopes of expanded access, reduced cost growth, and better
overall quality of care.  One commentator neatly summed up
the competitive payoff to managed care by asking: “Is that all
there is?”168
B. Managed Care and Hospital Mergers
Former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once
quipped that the sole consistency he could detect in litigation
under section 7 of the Clayton Act was that the government
always won.169  From the late 1980s through the early 2000s,
166 See Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 15–20, 40–41. R
167 See generally GEORGE C. HALVORSON & GEORGE J. ISHAM, EPIDEMIC OF CARE: A
CALL FOR SAFER, BETTER, AND MORE ACCOUNTABLE HEALTH CARE (2003) (calling for
more integrated care through HMOs).
168 Robert A. Berenson, Market Competition—Is That All There Is?, 22 HEALTH
AFF. 274 (2003) (reviewing HALVORSON & ISHAM, supra note 167).  When the eco- R
nomic boom of the 1990s and early 2000s eventually slowed and reversed, broad-
network HMO products with minimal cost-sharing—which were common in the
late 1990s—became unaffordable and, in most markets, unavailable.  Only sharp
increases in deductibles and copayments prevented PPO-based insurance prod-
ucts from suffering a similar fate.  More recently, narrow-network HMOs in which
care is more tightly managed seem to be making a comeback, a trend that reduces
the bargaining power of hospitals except in true monopoly markets.  This newer
generation of managed care plans also includes intermediate forms, such as
tiered networks with differential cost sharing.  David H. Howard, Adverse Effects
of Prohibiting Narrow Provider Networks, 371 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 591 (2014)
(discussing new network structures).
169 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (action by United States to enjoin acquisition by one grocery company
of its direct competitor, even though neither has a large market share).
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the DOJ and FTC unexpectedly lost seven consecutive chal-
lenges to hospital mergers.170
The government brought cases that fit its horizontal
merger guidelines neatly, and anticompetitive effects seemed
readily provable using established metrics.171  Because hospi-
tals are large, complex institutions, proposed mergers in many
communities tended to be associated with both high pre-
merger HHIs and large potential HHI increases if four hospitals
became three or three became two.172  There are often no sub-
stitutes for hospitalization, and patients can travel only so far
when seriously ill.  Hospitals are hard to build or move, creat-
ing barriers to entry by new competitors.173  Finally, the argu-
ments that community hospitals made in defense of
consolidation, such as their service to the poor and their desire
to avoid duplicating expensive services (often called a “medical
arms race”), fell outside the economic frame that is supposed to
govern merger analysis and therefore seemed not to be cogniza-
ble in court.174
Why, then, did the government lose so consistently?  Al-
though the hospital mergers challenged by the government
170 See Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. FTC., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (Poplar
Bluff, MO) (FTC and state of Missouri unsuccessfully sought to enjoin merger of
two hospitals); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff’d, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000) (Oakland, CA) (state of California
unsuccessfully brought suit against two hospitals, claiming that proposed merger
would have anticompetitive effect); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Nassau County, NY) (government unsuccess-
fully sought to enjoin merger of two not-for-profit “anchor hospitals”); FTC. v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (Grand Rapids,
MI) (FTC unsuccessfully sought preliminary injunction to prevent merger of two
hospitals); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa
1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3D 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (Dubuque, IA) (government
unsuccessfully brought antitrust action against two hospitals to enjoin proposed
merger); FTC. v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69
F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (Joplin, MO) (FTC unsuccessfully filed motion for prelimi-
nary injunction seeking to prohibit consolidation of hospitals pending resolution
of administrative proceedings as to legality of consolidation); FTC v. Hosp. Bd. of
Dirs. of Lee County, No. 94–137–CIV–FTM–25D, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19770
(M.D. Fla. May 16, 1994), aff’d, 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994) (Lee County, FL)
(FTC unsuccessfully filed complaint to prevent county hospital board’s proposed
purchase of private hospital in county, alleging that purchase would be anticom-
petitive in violation of Clayton Act).
171 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3 (1984), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.htm [http://perma.cc/QQ3S-YH5K?type=
source] (horizontal merger guidelines in 1984).
172 Id. § 3.1 Concentration and Market Shares (discussing the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index).
173 Id. § 4.131 Market Concentration (discussing barriers to entry).
174 Id. § 2.12 Relevant Evidence (discussing types of evidence used in merger
analysis).
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conveyed a clear picture of illegality when seen from the eco-
nomics-driven middle ground of conventional merger analysis,
the image evaporated both higher up and lower down.  From
the high ground, the cases seemed backwards.  In the prevail-
ing narrative of the time, nonprofit hospitals were good guys
even if they happened to be sellers, managed care organiza-
tions were bad guys even if they happened to be buyers, and
the government should not help the latter exploit the former.175
Down in the weeds, within “markets” that were really commu-
nities, the merging hospitals enjoyed a high degree of trust,
including from prominent businesspeople who sat on their gov-
erning boards and who were also buyers of hospital services for
their workers.176  In one case, the proposed merger was under-
taken partially in response to the recommendations from a
formal community-based needs assessment, an overhang of
1970s-style health planning that did not confer formal immu-
nity under antitrust law but that nevertheless evidenced the
good citizenship of the hospitals.177
Moreover, in the much less sophisticated market that exis-
ted then for economic expertise in antitrust litigation, defend-
ants were able to create enough noise in the data to disrupt the
evidentiary base needed to find anticompetitive effect.178  In
particular, geographic markets turned out to be surprisingly
malleable,179 especially when judges and juries were sympa-
175 See, e.g., Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1302 (“In the real
world, hospitals are in the business of saving lives, and managed care organiza-
tions are in the business of saving dollars.”).
176 See, e.g., id. at 1296 (detailing defendant hospitals’ argument that “non-
profit hospitals do not operate in the same manner as profit maximizing busi-
nesses,” as nonprofit hospital boards “are comprised of community business
leaders who have a direct stake in maintaining high quality, low cost hospital
services”); FTC. v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222–23 (W.D. Mo. 1995),
aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that because the combined Board is
composed primarily of persons who “indirectly represent the interests of hospital
consumers . . . it would not be in these individual Board member’s best economic
interest to permit prices to be raised beyond a normal competitive level”).  Even
large insurers could be complacent, allowing courts to infer that competitive harm
was unlikely.  United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121,
132 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting the CEO of a major New York insurer as admitting
that the merging hospitals were “doing exactly what they should do . . . [to] enable
them to deliver a better health care product . . . [and] a much more cost effective
system.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)) .
177 Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1289.
178 See id. at 1302–03 (“The Court, . . . having duly considered the voluminous
exhibits introduced by the parties,  . . . concludes that defendants have persua-
sively rebutted not only the FTC’s prima facie case but also the FTC’s additional
evidence of anticompetitive effect.”).
179 Tenet Health Care Corp. v. FTC, 186 F.3d 1045, 1051–54 (8th Cir. 1999);
Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 140–43.
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thetic toward the merging parties, and even substantial in-
creases in concentration were interpreted as harmless to
consumers using the analytic methods then in vogue.180
The prosecutorial failures of the 1990s did not sit well with
the FTC and DOJ.  During the 2000s, while the government’s
litigators were licking their wounds and very little of interest
was happening in the delivery of health care, agency econo-
mists and academic researchers studied both the markets in-
volved in these cases and the more general relationship
between provider consolidation and price/quality characteris-
tics.  This research was collected and analyzed by a Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation initiative called the Synthesis Pro-
ject, which published a report in 2006 and an update in
2012.181  The Synthesis Project concluded that less competitive
hospital markets have higher prices and may have lower qual-
ity.182  Moreover, there was no relationship between the fee-for-
service prices charged by hospitals and their status as charita-
ble or proprietary entities.183  In fact nonprofit hospitals as well
as for-profit hospitals acquired and exercised market power to
the detriment of consumers.184
The narrative of good and evil changed as well, reinforcing
the agencies’ commitment to hospital merger enforcement.
Managed care had been defanged, and it was no longer consid-
ered a public menace.  With health care costs continuing to rise
and large hospitals seemingly contemptuous of real-world eco-
180 See Kenneth G. Elzinga & Anthony W. Swishier, Limits of the Elzinga-
Hogarty Test in Hospital Mergers: The Evanston Case, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 133,
142–43 (2011); Cory S. Capps et al., The Silent Majority Fallacy of the Elzinga-
Hogarty Criteria: A Critique and New Approach to Analyzing Hospital Mergers
27–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8216, 2001) (predict-
ing the increase in price that various mergers would generate and concluding
some hospital mergers could lead to significant price increases); see also But-
terworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1295 (describing studies conducted by the
defendant’s economic expert, Dr. William J. Lynk, which found that higher hospi-
tal concentration benefits consumers by decreasing nonprofit hospital prices).
181 See GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 17 (studying why the rapid consolidation of R
hospitals occurred and what impact it had on the price and quality for patients,
and the cost of care for hospitals); VOGT & TOWN, supra note 19. R
182 GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 19, at 1. R
183 David Dranove & Richard Ludwick, Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit
Hospitals: A Reassessment of Lynk’s Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87, 97 (1999)
(concluding that prices charged by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals post-merger
are similar).
184 Emmett B. Keeler et. al, The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-profit
and For-Profit Hospital Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69, 69, 83 (1999)
(study showing “the association of hospital prices with measures of market con-
centration changed steadily [from 1986–94], with prices [at the end of the study]
higher in less competitive areas, even for non-profit hospitals”).
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nomic constraints, providers that were the apparent victims
twenty years ago saw their reputations tarnished and their
business deals scrutinized once again.  A series of reports by
the Attorney General’s Office in Massachusetts, for example,
blamed hospitals—including several world-famous institu-
tions—for charging arbitrary and exorbitant prices.185  An out-
growth of Massachusetts’ enactment in 2006 of state-based
universal coverage, these documents presaged the current de-
bate over provider consolidation as the ACA is implemented
nationwide.
At the same time, the FTC and DOJ began reinvestigating
past transactions and reinvigorating enforcement procedures.
The legal payoff from renewed enforcement has been substan-
tial, with the agencies successfully halting or unwinding sev-
eral recent hospital mergers.186  Following its re-analysis of the
Evanston, Illinois, market, for example, FTC staff filed an ad-
ministrative action to challenge a transaction there five years
after it had been consummated.187  In 2005, an administrative
law judge concluded that the merger should be unwound.188
More recently, the FTC succeeded in obtaining both a prelimi-
nary injunction in federal district court and an ALJ determina-
tion of anticompetitive effect in connection with a hospital
merger in Toledo, Ohio, and a preliminary injunction against a
proposed merger in Rockford, Illinois.189
C. Preparing to Fight the Last War: Merger Policy and the
ACA
The tide may have turned once again in favor of close scru-
tiny of hospital consolidation, but recent merger enforcement
continues to view hospital markets largely through a late 1990s
185 MASS. ATT’Y GEN.’S OFFICE, supra note 76, at 1, 19. R
186 In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. & ENH Med. Group, Inc.,
No. 9315, 144 F.T.C. 1, 521–23 (Aug. 2, 2007) (Evanston, IL); FTC v. OSF Health-
care Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Rockford, IL); FTC v.
ProMedica Health Sys., No. 3:11 CV 47, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33434, at *50 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (Toledo, OH).
187 Complaint at 1, In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., (No. 9315),
2005 WL 2845790 (F.T.C.) (Feb. 10, 2004).
188 In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 2005 WL 2845790, at
*177–78 (F.T.C.) (Oct. 20, 2005).  On review, the full Commission agreed the
merger was anticompetitive but declined to order divestiture. In re Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195, at *78–79 (F.T.C.) (Aug. 6,
2007).
189 FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 2012);
FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., No 3:11–CV–47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *50 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2011); In re ProMedica Health System Inc., F.T.C. No. 9346 (Dec.
12, 2011).
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lens.  To the enforcement agencies, intervention in hospital
mergers is still justified primarily by the belief that the merged
hospitals will increase their negotiating clout vis-à-vis insur-
ers, not by concern over output restriction and deadweight
loss, or even managerial slack, that traditionally comprise the
chief harms from market power.190
Current agency guidance bases enforcement decisions on a
model of “two-stage competition” in hospital markets.  First,
hospitals bargain over the terms of inclusion in insurers’ net-
works; second, insured patients choose among contract facili-
ties for specific services.191  The two-stage construct, however,
is a compromise that emerged from the regulatory backlash
against managed care in the late 1990s, which discouraged
selective contracting and tightly managed care, and normalized
broad networks that promise enrollees negotiated prices for
covered but unmanaged services.192  Perpetuating such a styl-
ized, effete form of managed care is hardly a compelling ratio-
nale for hostility to provider consolidation among antitrust
enforcers.
The Synthesis Project, for example, was a product of its
time, and speaks mainly to the effects of health care consolida-
tion between the Clinton administration’s health care reform
effort in 1993–94 and the passage of the ACA in 2010.193  Few
of the studies it collected demonstrated specific benefits from
lack of hospital consolidation beyond the routine ascription of
increased consumer welfare to reduced prices for disaggregated
services.194  As the Institute of Medicine and others have ex-
plained, American health care is so routinely wasteful that it is
difficult to regard small pricing changes alone as evidence of
substantial improvement.195
190 In its successful enforcement action in Rockford, Illinois, for example, the
FTC argued that “the merger would still harm competition . . . as health plans
would have greater leverage playing three hospital systems off one another rather
than merely two.”  Plaintiff’s Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum in Sup-
port of Preliminary Injunction at 8, F.T.C. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d
1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (No. 11 C 50344).
191 Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 671, 673–74 (2000).
192 See Paul B. Ginsburg, Competition in Health Care: Its Evolution Over the
Past Decade, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1512, 1516–17 (2005).
193 See GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 17; VOGT & TOWN, supra note 19. R
194 See GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 17, at 6; VOGT & TOWN, supra note 19, at R
8–9.
195 INST. OF MED., supra note 21, at 99–105 (estimating annual healthcare R
waste to be at $750 billion).  For a skeptical view about understanding competi-
tion based on merger retrospective studies, see Gregory J. Werden, Inconvenient
Truths on Merger Retrospective Studies 19 (Jan. 5, 2015) (unpublished working
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Moreover, the enforcement agencies may be inventing
problems in markets that happen to be easy to evaluate instead
of evaluating markets that have the biggest problems.196  Price
discounting became ubiquitous among hospitals because so
many had been built in response to decades of government
subsidies and cost-unconscious insurance payment prac-
tices.197  In particular, hospital beds proliferated in small and
medium-sized geographic markets, which is where the enforce-
ment agencies tend to concentrate their merger prevention ef-
forts.198  Without Hill-Burton funds, tax-exempt bond
financing, Medicare cost-plus and capital cost reimbursement,
and other nonmarket supports, these communities would have
built fewer and smaller hospitals to begin with.199  Even after
hospital consolidation, there is no evidence that these commu-
nities are a major source of waste and inefficiency in health
care or that hospitals in larger cities systematically outperform
them.
An additional challenge is that the analytic methods cur-
rently in vogue depend almost entirely on historical patterns to
predict the competitive outcomes of hospital mergers.200  This
may be appropriate in times of relative stability, but it is haz-
ardous when the regulatory determinants of health care mar-
kets are undergoing rapid change.  In the Marshfield Clinic
case, then Chief Judge Posner justified the defendant’s size
and scope on the grounds that smaller providers would be
paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545343 [http://
perma.cc/6297-5LTV].
196 It will usually be possible to show high market shares and large changes in
concentration whenever one in three or one in four hospitals ceases to operate as
an independent business.  Under the Merger Guidelines, virtually any merger
involving competitors in a market with four hospitals or less would be “presump-
tively unlawful.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 171, §§ 4–5. R
197 See Comment, The Hill-Burton Act, 1946–1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery
of Health Care to the Poor, 39 MD. L. REV. 316, 324 (1979) [hereinafter “The Hill-
Burton Act”].
198 See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Anti-
trust Law, 22 HEALTH AFF. 88, 89 (2003). The federal enforcement agencies refrain
from challenging the great majority of merger and acquisition transactions that
occur each year.  In 2013, the Agencies were notified of 1326 total mergers or
acquisitions across all industries (the FTC challenged 23 and DOJ challenged 15).
Of 59 transactions involving health care services of which they were notified, the
government challenged three. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-
SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/36th-report-fy2013/140521hsrreport.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M9F5-K68X].
199 See The Hill-Burton Act, supra note 197, at 324. R
200 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy
/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/32RW-D2ED].
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“competing to provide horse-and-buggy medicine.”201  Simi-
larly, a standalone hospital today that is unable to combine its
services with those of physicians or adopt new organizational
structures and information systems would be competing to
provide overly expensive, insufficiently effective “twentieth cen-
tury medicine,” not the high-quality, cost-effective health care
needed in the twenty-first century.
Basing enforcement priorities on predictive models that
rely so heavily on past conditions is likely to be misleading at
best, and at worst to cause substantial harm by chilling pro-
ductive innovation.  The United States is now experiencing an-
other discontinuity in regulation and payment, with profound
implications for health care markets.202  Much as government
has heavily influenced market structure, conduct, and per-
formance in the past, changes in regulation will influence fu-
ture competitive outcomes as the ACA is implemented.203
From one perspective, the ACA was narrowly partisan leg-
islation.  From another perspective, the ACA was an extraordi-
nary achievement—the successful culmination of a 100-year
effort to universalize health coverage in the United States.204
Its passage after decades of political and policy failure com-
pleted the New Deal pledge of solidarity in the face of adversity
and finally brought the United States into the company of the
world’s other developed nations, all of which make health in-
surance universally available to their citizens.
201 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412
(7th Cir. 1995).
202 See Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Mod-
els: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1540–41 (1984).
203 The FTC has cautioned in its public statements not to “ignore the lessons
of the last quarter century” regarding market power and health care costs. Anti-
trust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11
(2010) (statement of Richard A. Feinstein, Dir. of the Bureau of Competition, Fed.
Trade Comm’n) [hereinafter “Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry”].
204 The first attempt to bring the U.S. health policy more in line with the
progressive social democracies of Western Europe was Theodore Roosevelt’s 1912
campaign as the presidential nominee of the “Bull Moose” party.  Brian Palmer,
Obama Says Theodore Roosevelt Lobbied for Health Care Reform, SLATE (Mar. 9,
2010, 4:46 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/
2010/03/obama_says_theodore_roosevelt_lobbied_for_health_care_reform_.html
[http://perma.cc/PP9Q-DG22].  These efforts were renewed by every subsequent
Democratic administration and some Republican ones, culminating in the
landmark 1965 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid as a medical safety net for
the elderly and indigent. See BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 144 (exploring R
how modern presidents approached the politics of health care and health care
reform).
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Although its insurance reforms remain controversial in to-
day’s political environment, the ACA solves on paper the two
problems that most had limited Americans’ health coverage:
uninsurability based on health status and inability to afford
insurance.205  But that is not all.  The ACA’s true breakthrough
is its ambition also to address the inefficiency of health care
delivery and the nation’s poor underlying health.206  The ACA
adheres closely to the established path for U.S. health reform,
“managed competition,” to accomplish these goals, implying
that competition must do better in the future than in the
past.207  A principal objective of managed competition, strongly
evident in the ACA, is to channel insurers into competing on
the care they deliver rather than the actuarial risk they bear.208
Managed competition is not synonymous with managed
care, but proposals to universalize private health insurance
205 The ACA addresses the former problem by simultaneously prohibiting in-
surance companies from rejecting or surcharging applicants because of their
health and penalizing individuals who still fail to become insured.  The ACA ad-
dresses the latter problem by providing tax subsidies to working-class Americans
and by giving states generous financial assistance to make Medicaid available to
all citizens with income near or below the federal poverty line.  Sage, supra note
133, at 1082–83. R
206 Id. at 1082–85.  The Institute for Healthcare Improvement, a pioneer in
medical quality and safety, has challenged the health care system to pursue a
“Triple Aim” of improving the patients’ experience of care, improving the health of
populations, and reducing per capita cost. INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, IHI
TRIPLE AIM INITIATIVE (2015), http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/
pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/3XX3-EE5V].
207 Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Anti-
dote or Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811, 816–17, 826 (2011).  “[M]anaged competi-
tion” is most closely associated with the Clinton administration’s failed Health
Security Act.  Sage, supra note 133, at 1088.  In “single-payer” systems, govern- R
ment acts as sole insurer and pays health care providers directly for covered
services, usually at administratively determined rather than competitive rates.
Under “managed competition,” by contrast, government structures and monitors
competition among private health insurers to deliver covered services at market
prices. Id. at 1089; see Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice
Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to
Promote Quality and Economy (First of Two Parts), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29, 34–35
(1989); Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and
Economy (Second of Two Parts), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 94, 99–100 (1989).
208 Sage, supra note 133, at 1090.  The ACA mandates the establishment of R
public health insurance exchanges across the country to broker coverage for
individuals and small employers.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1311, 124 Stat. 173 (2010).  Insurers participating in
these exchanges operate under very different rules from traditional health plans,
including offering standardized benefits and complying with a blanket prohibition
on medical underwriting. Id. § 1302 (outlining essential health benefits); id.
§ 1201 (prohibiting underwriting based on preexisting conditions).  The ACA also
creates significant incentives to create or expand “private exchanges” not limited
to a single employer, which are subject to slightly different rules. Id. § 1311–12.
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have generally contemplated a leading role for “good” managed
care organizations that improve the cost-effectiveness of health
care delivery.209  The ACA takes a similar approach, looking to
organized systems of care that are publicly accountable for
quality as well as cost.210  Some of these are likely to be true
HMOs such as Kaiser, while others will be conventional health
insurers responding to the ACA’s changed incentives, and still
others will be experimental forms of health care delivery such
as ACOs and PCMHs.211
The ACA also offers a framework for a new vision of compe-
tition based on clinical outcomes and value-for-money, em-
ploying a variety of tools to change how physicians, hospitals,
and insurers do business.212  For hospital care, these include
strong inducements, both financial and organizational, to
avoid expensive inpatient care and, if it becomes necessary, to
provide it as safely and cost-effectively as possible.213  For ex-
ample, in combination with the Medicare program’s related
commitment to ACOs and medical homes, the ACA shifts pay-
ment models away from professional piecework, and toward
bundled or global payment for measurable improvements in
health outcomes.214  CMS directives also call for greater coordi-
nation among hospitals, physicians and ancillary care provid-
209 Sage, supra note 133, at 1091. R
210 See Terry L. Corbett, Healthcare Corporate Structure and the ACA: A Need
for Mission Primacy Through a New Organizational Paradigm?, 12 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 103, 165–66 (2015).
211 For a comparison of various types of organized systems of care see AM.
HOSP. ASS’N, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORG.: AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT 4–5 (2010).
212 Among those changes are the following: (i) Essential Health Benefits, Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1302, 124 Stat.
119 (2010); (ii) zero cost sharing for US Preventive Services Task Force A- or B-
rated services, id. § 4003; (iii) the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute
(PCORI) (comparative effectiveness research), id. § 6301; (iv) the Independent
Medicare Advisory Board, id. §§ 3403, 10320; (v) Accountable Care Organizations
(Medicare Shared Savings Program), id. § 3022, (vi) Patient-Centered Health
Homes (Medicaid), id. § 2703; (vii) bundled (episodic) payment pilot program for
acute and post-acute care, id. § 3023; (viii) the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Innovation (CMI) to test new, budget-neutral models for care delivery and provider
payment, id. § 3141, (ix) the hospital value-based purchasing program (Medicare
pay-for-performance), id. § 10326, (x) an expanded Medicare hospital quality re-
porting system, id. § 3001; (xi) an expanded Medicare physician quality reporting
system, id. § 3002; and (xii) the Independence at Home Demonstration Program to
avoid hospitalization (Medicare), id. § 3024.
213 Id. § 3025 (detailing the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, which
requires CMS to reduce DRG payments for Inpatient Prospective Payment System
(IPPS) hospitals with excessive readmissions).
214 On January 26, 2015, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services announced that Medicare would pursue an aggressive transition
from fee-for-service to other forms of provider payment. See U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., supra note 37. R
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ers to meet demand for health promotion, disease prevention,
chronic care management, and successful treatment of ill-
ness.215  Hospitals will only be able to deliver and receive com-
pensation for these more coherent products if they can
measure and report both their own performance and the per-
formance of their partners and affiliates, including physicians
and other health professionals.216
Provider consolidation today therefore represents a re-
newed search for efficient scope and scale not seen since the
early 1980s, when the introduction of Medicare DRGs shocked
hospitals into rethinking their business models.217  Even tak-
ing the efficiency claims of merging parties with a large grain of
salt, restructuring may enable hospitals to more accurately
assess their costs and outcomes, offer services jointly with phy-
sicians and other providers, and accept new forms of payment
that reward productive efficiency instead of billable volume.
Advances consequent to restructuring might even include im-
provements in safety and quality that ultimately reduce the
need for additional medical services.  Given these pressures
and expectations, forcing provider markets to remain artifi-
215 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3022 (establishing
the Medicare Shared Savings Program for Accountable Care Organizations).
Drawing from the “Triple Aim,” the three overarching goals of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for Accountable Care Organizations are to
enable (i) better care for individuals, (ii) better health for populations, and (iii)
lower growth in Medicare Parts A and B expenditures. See Medicare Program;
Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,802, 67,803 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).  CMS has also
established the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation, which will test inno-
vative payment and delivery models in order to lower costs and enhance quality of
care.  Stuart Guterman et al., Innovation in Medicare and Medicaid Will Be Central
to Health Reform’s Success, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1188, 1188–89 (2010).
216 For example, section 3025 of the ACA implements the Hospital Readmis-
sions Reduction Program, which decreases Medicare DRG payments for certain
hospitals with high readmissions rates.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act § 3025.  The Affordable Care Act also expands the use of pay-for-performance
initiatives in Medicare. Id. § 10326.
217 See David Dranove, Viewing Health Care Consolidation Through the Lens of
the Economics of Strategy, in ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION CHANGES IN
HEALTHCARE FINANCING AND ORGANIZATION REPORT 2–3 (2010), https://
www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/HCFOReportMarch2010.pdf [http://
perma.cc/73HY-JY8Z] (noting that hospitals claim mergers bring much-needed
efficiencies and prevent cost-increasing medical arms’ races).  However, hospital
consolidation since the 1990s has almost always been limited to the corporate
shell.  Very few facilities actually have been closed or downsized, which also
suggests that consolidated hospitals seldom reduce output as would a classic
monopolist. See Kathryn Saenz Duke, Hospitals in a Changing Health Care Sys-
tem, 15 HEALTH AFF. 49, 54 (1996). This departure from the conventional econom-
ics of market power provides additional support for the idea that health care
products are unlike products elsewhere in the economy.
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cially fragmented may actually reduce competing providers’ in-
centives and ability to improve their products.  For example,
providers in more concentrated markets may be better able to
invest in community health and disease prevention, which are
essential to long-term cost control.
The tension between old-market and new-market perspec-
tives is evident in a recent judicial decision involving a hospital
merger or acquisition, FTC v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd.218
In St. Luke’s, the federal government and the state of Idaho
sued a Boise hospital system that had acquired a physician
group practice in the adjoining community of Nampa, where
the hospital already had an inpatient facility.219  After a hear-
ing, a federal judge ordered the hospital to divest itself of the
acquired physicians, finding that the transaction had in-
creased the hospital’s bargaining leverage with health insurers
in the market for “primary care physician” services.220  The
judge also concluded that the acquisition would increase prices
for certain diagnostic services ordered by the newly affiliated
physicians because the hospital would be able to apply more
lucrative billing codes associated with hospital-based care.221
At the same time, however, the judge praised the hospital
for preparing to compete in a post-ACA environment in which
payment will be based on patient outcomes rather than the
volume of services.222  “In a world that was not governed by the
Clayton Act,” he wrote, “the best result might be to approve the
Acquisition and . . . see if the predicted price increases actually
occurred. . . .  But the Clayton Act . . . does not give the Court
discretion to . . . conduct a health care experiment.”223
Indeed, keeping physicians economically independent of
hospitals is not a desirable policy over the long term.  Similarly,
a market for primary care physician services should lose its
coherence as other professionals and other modalities become
available to provide basic medical care.224  At the same time,
Medicare should, and undoubtedly will, change its rules re-
218 Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, FTC v. St. Luke’s Health System,
Ltd., 2014 WL 407446 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) (No. 1:13–CV–00116–BLW), aff’d
sub nom. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.,
778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
219 See Saint Alphonsus, 778 F.3d at 781–82.
220 See Memorandum Decision & Order at 3–4, FTC v. St. Luke’s Health Sys-
tem, Ltd., No. 1:13–CV–00116–BLW (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014).
221 See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, supra note 218, ¶¶ 124–25. R
222 See id. ¶ 149.
223 Id. ¶¶ 76–77.
224 See, e.g., Daniel McCarthy, Note, The Virtual Economy: Telemedicine and
the Supply of Primary Care Physicians in Rural America, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 111,
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garding relative payment for hospital-based and nonhospital
outpatient services as the competitive landscape evolves.225
Admittedly, enthusiasm for productive change may fade if
politics intervenes, fatigue sets in, another economic bubble
begins, or interest in continued reform is eclipsed by other,
more pressing national concerns.  But it would be a serious
mistake for overzealous antitrust enforcement to turn the de-
mise of delivery system reform into a self-fulfilling prophecy by
deterring private innovation or persuading regulators that
nothing else needs to be done.  The last section of this Article
proposes a different approach, in which both antitrust enforc-
ers and regulators work in concert to reorient the health care
system toward assembled products and the superior competi-
tive outcomes that those products can offer.
III
TOWARD BETTER PRODUCTS: ALIGNING ANTITRUST WITH
REGULATORY CHANGE
The persistence of unassembled products in health care
poses a challenge for antitrust analysis because the economic
underpinnings of modern antitrust law—like many welfarist
calculations—tend to regard buyers’ preferences as exoge-
nously determined and therefore incontestable.226  In an influ-
ential 1978 book, Robert Bork argued that the activist antitrust
law of the time paradoxically made markets less rather than
more efficient.227  The “Chicago School” of antitrust analysis
that arose in response was based on a reductionist notion, in
which enforcement is used sparingly and legal institutions rec-
112–13 (1995) (examining “telemedicine” as a method of providing basic medical
care to rural communities).
225 In fact, payment policy was altered after this Article was written. See
Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Quality Report-
ing Programs, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,200 (July 8, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
410) (discussing a change to Medicare payment for nonhospital outpatient
services).
226 Compare Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 168 (1999) (analyzing cost-benefit analysis from legal,
economic, and philosophical perspectives), with RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4
(2009) (developing a theory of “libertarian paternalism” to overcome cognitive
biases).
227 ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 71 (1978) (arguing the original intent
of antitrust laws as well as economic efficiency make consumer welfare and the
protection of competition, rather than competitors, the only goals of antitrust
law).
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ognize their own limitations.228  It postulates that markets gen-
erate their own priorities, and that competition will occur along
the dimensions that consumers prefer.229  It also posits that
innovation and new entry will eventually overcome most
monopolies.230
Chicago School antitrust analysis therefore regards with
considerable skepticism the argument that the services that
consumers appear to want are not in fact the services that
health care providers should compete to deliver.231  The classic
judicial statement of this perspective, from the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Indiana Federation of Dentists v. FTC, is that a
group of professionals may not preempt “the working of the
market by deciding for itself that customers do not need that
which they demand,” which constitutes “nothing less than a
frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”232
A weakness of the Chicago School approach is its relative
incompatibility with highly regulated industries, in which
neither baseline conditions nor trajectories of change necessa-
rily follow market models.  Public regulation coexists with com-
petition in many industrial sectors,233 yet the interaction
between the two governance regimes has seldom been a focus
of competition policy.  The most straightforward accommoda-
tions antitrust analysis makes to regulation—state action and
implied federal repeal—are not often available to guide enforce-
ment.234  States seldom clearly articulate and actively super-
vise regulatory regimes that supplant competitive processes
(all-payer rate setting and certificate of need laws being vestig-
228 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925, 928 (1979) (criticizing government intervention in the economy).
229 See id. at 926.
230 See id. at 932–33.
231 See Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law
in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 861 (2004) (noting that the Chicago School
is resistant to insights from other disciplines that call into question the core
assumption of neoclassical economics).
232 FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457, 462 (1986) (quoting
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)) (holding
horizontal policy agreement among dental association members to withhold infor-
mation requested by insurers to violate the Sherman Act).
233 See, e.g., Harvey L. Reiter, Competition Between Public and Private Distribu-
tors in a Restructured Power Industry, 19 ENERGY L.J. 333, 333–34 (1998) (dis-
cussing the impact of regulations on private sector energy distributors).
234 See Bobak Razavi, Harmonizing Antitrust Exemption Law: A Hybrid Ap-
proach to State Action and Implied Repeal, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 6–7 (2009)
(discussing the implied repeal and state action accommodations to antitrust
regulation).
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ial counterexamples).235  Nor does Congress often deliberately
substitute federal regulation for marketplace competition (ex-
clusivity rights for biomedical innovation being a persistent
counterexample).236
The neutrality that antitrust law scrupulously displays to-
ward the objectives of competition in less regulated industries
is in significant tension with the wasteful production and allo-
cation habits of the ostensibly competitive but underperform-
ing U.S. health care system.237  Notably, if health care products
systematically lack market justification, antitrust enforcement
based on Chicago School principles will be at best a weak force
serving the public interest.  Whether prices for unassembled
products are too high or quality too low in a particular case will
have less impact on overall consumer welfare than enabling
better products to emerge.238
This suggests that antitrust law should play a more direc-
tive role in health care, breaking down regulatory and habitual
barriers to market entry by new competitors offering better
value for money, and placing a thumb on the scale in dealing
with current competitors in favor of assembling today’s faux
products into more meaningful ones.  The former strategy is
entirely compatible with prevailing thinking among antitrust
economists, although it takes a long-term view of broadening
competition through innovation.  The latter strategy is more
controversial, but it seems a necessary supplement to antitrust
enforcement decisions in existing markets.  To accomplish it,
antitrust law must develop analytics that anticipate future
competitive priorities in health care, integrating both market
and regulatory governance.
235 See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67
HASTINGS L.J. 85, 96, 129 (2015) (noting that two-thirds of all states have certifi-
cate of need laws while only one state (Maryland) uses an all-payer rate setting
system).
236 See Henry G. Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and
Development Incentives in Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFF. 302
(2015) (arguing that patent protection helps encourage innovation in the market
for biomedicine).
237 See Tanya G.K. Bentley et al., Waste in the U.S. Health Care System: A
Conceptual Framework, 86 MILBANK Q. 629, 630 (2008) (contending that waste
arises in the U.S. health care system because system participants lack incentives
to economize).
238 The statement in Indiana Federation of Dentists was also less sweeping
than it might seem.  At the time of the decision, antitrust enforcers had only just
begun to engage the professions.  While the enforcers no longer turned a blind eye
to blatantly anticompetitive conduct such as price fixing, they remained deferen-
tial to the professional judgments and traditions that are constitutive of the health
care industry. See supra text accompanying note 217. R
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How can antitrust law induce product improvement?  This
section of the Article identifies priority areas for antitrust en-
forcement, such as deterring exclusionary conduct, discusses
the relationship between antitrust enforcers and regulators,
and proposes ways in which both groups of competition policy-
makers can collaborate in pursuit of better health care
products.
The ACA creates openings for antitrust enforcers and regu-
lators to work in tandem to improve the outcomes of competi-
tion in health care, and the federal antitrust agencies are
already cooperating in this effort.  The FTC delivered a prepared
statement in December 2010 to the Judiciary Committee of the
U.S. House of Representatives describing its intention to use
antitrust enforcement to drive health care reform by lowering
prices and fostering innovation through competition.239  Sub-
sequently, both antitrust enforcement agencies collaborated
with Medicare on rules for the Shared Savings (ACO) Program
that attempt to harmonize competition analysis with evolving
federal regulation.240
A. Product-Enhancing Antitrust Analysis
If close scrutiny of merger transactions in medium-sized
communities is not likely to result in sustained public benefit
because it perpetuates an artificial bargaining process between
providers and insurers, what enforcement agenda might better
serve the goal of product improvement articulated by previous
sections of this Article?  As a threshold matter, it is important
to consider the vocabulary and methods associated with anti-
trust analysis that bear on the question of using competition
policy to help move medical markets toward assembled
products.
1. Product Market Definition
Antitrust analysis typically defines a “product market” to
analyze the competitive effects of a proposed merger or other
challenged conduct.241  The product market includes the item
being sold and its plausible economic substitutes and excludes
239 Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry, supra note 203, at 2. R
240 FTC and Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Re-
garding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared
Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026–32 (Oct. 28, 2011).
241 There is an ongoing debate over the importance of product market defini-
tion in merger analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 276–78. R
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other things.242  One clue that disaggregated health care ser-
vices may not be products in the usual economic sense is that
providers with apparent market power may charge higher
prices for each service but do not seem to restrict the volume of
services as would a classic monopolist or cartel facing a stan-
dard demand curve.  Instead, health economists use terms like
“supplier-induced demand”243 and the “target-income hypoth-
esis”244 to describe the ability of physicians, in almost any
market configuration, to deliver as many services as they
choose.245
In delimiting these markets, health care antitrust litigation
often finesses the question of how the skills of the providers
engaged in the transaction map onto the medical needs of pa-
tients—which is another indication that what we have labeled
products in health care are not products in the usual sense.
When two electronics manufacturers propose to merge, anti-
trust enforcers define a market for televisions, music players,
or computers—not for making blueprints, maintaining “clean
rooms,” or encasing electronic components in metal frames.246
However, it is the unusual antitrust case that defines a market
for “hip surgery” or “cancer treatment.”247
Admittedly, it would be impractical to measure a merger’s
effect on competition for each of thousands of billable
processes and inputs, or for each of hundreds of medical
problems.  Enforcement agencies and courts therefore use um-
brella terms such as “physician services,” “inpatient hospital
services,” “outpatient services,” “acute care services” and the
like.248  In recent litigation, for example, the FTC separated
242 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
243 Supplier-induced demand occurs when an asymmetry of information
exists between supplier and consumer. FELDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 268–69. R
244 The target income hypothesis suggests that a physician is motivated to
maintain a certain level of desired income and if their actual income falls below
this level, a physician will modify his behavior to restore income to the targeted
level. Id. at 269.
245 This short-term change in output is different from the longer-term changes
that occur when newly created diagnoses or therapies turn nonmedical problems
into medical ones or alter the risk-benefit calculus of seeking treatment rather
than remaining untreated, especially when health insurance moderates the finan-
cial consequences.
246 See, e.g., A.I. Root Co. v. Comput./Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 675 (6th
Cir. 1986) (defining a “small computer market” in an antitrust case involving
electronics manufacturers).
247 See, e.g., Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 212 (3d Cir. 2005)
(defining product markets for “general outpatient cataract surgery,” “general inpa-
tient cataract surgery,” and “general emergency eye surgery”).
248 See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, supra note 218, ¶ 49 (identify- R
ing the relevant product market as the market for “physician services”).
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markets for inpatient hospital services from markets for pri-
mary care physician services in alleging the likelihood of harm
to consumers from the merger of two hospitals with employed
physicians.249  This product definition has a superficial appeal
because of historical practices generating separate bills for pro-
fessional and facility fees in both outpatient and inpatient set-
tings.  But it fails to capture the intent of Medicare’s new care
and payment models, which place a heavy emphasis on com-
munity-based prevention and management of chronic dis-
ease—the dominant source of medical need in the United
States today—to reduce the frequency of inpatient acute
care.250
In the short term, enforcers and courts are unlikely to shift
their approach to product markets in health care from one
based on producers or inputs to one based on assembled out-
puts.  Over the longer term, however, they should be open to
doing so.  As noted above, for example, the market for “primary
care physician” services defined in the St. Luke’s case may
become incoherent when consumers access basic medical care
from a variety of sources, ranging from nurse practitioners to
mobile medical apps.251
There is also a deeper issue.  With respect to physicians,
we know that most physicians are willing to care for patients
with more than a single type of problem, but we also know that
very few physicians are willing to care for patients with every
type of problem.  With respect to hospitals, we know that they
do far more than provide a place for patients to sleep, but we
are less confident about whether the successful treatment of a
particular problem depends primarily on characteristics of the
hospital or of the physicians who happen to be present there.  If
a physician lacks a key credential, or a hospital lacks a critical
technology, it may disqualify that provider from certain ser-
249 See Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction,
FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 2011 WL 6917813 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2011) (No.
11–CV–50344); see also Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s
Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
250 For example, through its authority granted under section 3021 of the Af-
fordable Care Act, the CMS Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation created
the Comprehensive Primary Care Initiative, which is designed, in part, to en-
courage primary care in an effort to reduce preventable hospitalizations. See
MELINDA ABRAMS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, REALIZING HEALTH REFORM’S PO-
TENTIAL: HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WILL STRENGTHEN PRIMARY CARE AND BENEFIT
PATIENTS, PROVIDERS, AND PAYERS 10 (2011).
251 See Miranda Laurant et al., Substitution of Doctors by Nurses in Primary
Care (Review), COCHRANE LIBR., 2005, at 1, 2 (finding that properly trained nurses
can produce as high quality care as primary care physicians).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 55 16-MAR-16 15:47
2016] ASSEMBLED PRODUCTS 663
vices—hence notions of “primary,” “secondary,” and “tertiary”
care.252  But what qualifies that provider to do a particular
task, and what makes that provider truly good at it, are harder
concepts to nail down.
2. Payer Submarkets
It is important to include all health care payers in most
competitive analyses.  Plaintiffs in antitrust cases attempt to
draw markets as narrowly as possible, so that market concen-
tration appears higher and the risk of anticompetitive effect
greater.253  One strategy, embraced by both the enforcement
agencies and private plaintiffs, has been to limit the alleged
product market to health care services purchased by private
payers, meaning commercial insurance companies and self-
insured employers rather than government health insurance
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.254  The logic behind
this position is that government programs pay administered
prices, not market prices, and therefore would not be harmed
economically by a merger.
However, the scale of government investment in health
care renders any analysis of competitive outcomes that focuses
only on private market transactions misleading.255  Public pay-
ers often set the tone for private payers, and competitive out-
comes flow from the interaction between them.  Medicare is an
essential funder of nearly all hospitals in the United States,
and its practices serve as a benchmark for both the amount
paid by private insurers and the payment methodology they
employ.256  Sometimes this occurs because government takes
252 See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 n.2 (W.D.
Mich. 1996) (defining these levels of care).
253 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15
(1991) (“Because market power is often inferred from market share, market defini-
tion generally determines the result of the case.”); JetAway Aviation, LLC v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm’rs, 754 F.3d 824, 850 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that the plaintiff bears
the burden of defining the relevant market in antitrust cases).
254 See, e.g., Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1165–66 (N.D. Cal.
2013); First Amended Complaint at 16, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 4 F. Supp. 3d
1160 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 3:12–cv–4854–LB) (noting that plaintiffs argue that the
relevant product market consisted of inpatient services not paid for by Medicare,
Medicaid, or government payers).
255 Moreover, excluding public payers has the unfortunate consequence of
making managed care contracting over faux products even more central to the
competitive analysis than if public payers were included. See supra text accom-
panying notes 198–203. R
256 In addition to negotiating discounts based on “charges,” private insurers
often employ payment approaches based on government programs, such as ex-
plicit percentages of Medicare DRG payments, or per diem rates similar to those
used by Medicaid.  For this reason, it is virtually certain that as Medicare changes
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the lead, as in the Medicare PPS (DRG) system, which was
tested at the state level and then adopted federally.257  At other
times, it occurs because government, for both political and
pragmatic reasons, models its policies on those already in place
in the private sector, as with the adoption of Medicare in
1965.258  Because the ACA relies heavily on both Medicare and
Medicaid, public payers will continue to be major drivers of
market performance.259
Although some courts have accepted a payer-specific prod-
uct market definition,260 others have not.  In Little Rock Cardi-
ology Clinic v. Baptist Health,261 the plaintiff alleged a product
market limited to only those patients covered by private health
insurance.  Finding this definition “legally flawed,” the district
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.262  The Eighth
Circuit affirmed, holding that, “as a matter of law, in an anti-
trust claim brought by a seller, a product market cannot be
limited to a single method of payment when there are other
methods of payment that are acceptable to the seller.”263
3. Characterizing the Parties
Properly characterizing the parties in transactions that
might move the health care system from unassembled to as-
sembled products is challenging.  Antitrust enforcers are ac-
customed to using labels with clear economic meanings, such
as buyer, seller, vertical agreement, horizontal agreement, sub-
its payment methods, collaborative structures (e.g., ACOs, medical homes), and
quality benchmarking practices, private insurers will pursue similar purchasing
strategies. See, e.g., BERENSON & BURTON, supra note 8 (noting that, while ACOs R
are typically viewed as primarily a Medicare program, Medicare’s approach is
already affecting the way in which private health plans pay providers, with nearly
100 medical groups on track to become ACOs).
257 Janus & Brown, supra note 55, at 298 (discussing the adoption by the R
federal government in 1983 of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), which were
modeled off a successful program administered by the New Jersey Department of
Health in the late 1970s).
258 William M. Sage, Competition Policy and the Future of Health Care Mar-
kets 25 (Sept. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
259 See supra text accompanying note 198. R
260 See, e.g., FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (noting that the FTC established a prima facie case that merger of two not-
for-profit health care systems would be anticompetitive).
261 591 F.3d 591, 596–98 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding relevant product market
could not be limited to patients using private insurance and relevant geographic
market could not be limited to single city).
262 Id. at 595.
263 Id. at 598–99.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 57 16-MAR-16 15:47
2016] ASSEMBLED PRODUCTS 665
stitute, or complement.264  Because of the complicated agency
relationships involved, and the consensus need for significant
industry restructuring to improve efficiency, these labels are
often ambiguous in health care.265  If hospitals and their affili-
ated physicians join forces to finance and direct comprehensive
care, for example, today’s providers may be tomorrow’s payers.
If care continues to move from dedicated facilities to commu-
nity and home settings, today’s hospitals may be tomorrow’s
physicians.  From the perspective of desired innovation, all in-
termediaries between a patient and the treatment he or she
receives are contestable.
The correct status of health insurers in the analysis of
competition is particularly difficult to ascertain.  Antitrust laws
were enacted to protect consumers, and seller conduct in mar-
kets has usually been more closely scrutinized than buyer con-
duct.266  As a result, courts seldom inquire into the priorities
and practices of health plans when evaluating hospital merg-
ers.267  However, health insurers can reasonably be regarded
not only as buyers from hospital systems but also as poten-
tially competing with those systems to provide coordinated ser-
vices (i.e., assembled products) for a bundled or global
payment.  Arranging for comprehensive health care at afforda-
ble prices was the expected role for HMOs from the 1970s into
the 1990s and is a desired outcome of the current move toward
ACOs.268
264 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in
Antritrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987).
265 Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Monopsony as an Agency and Regula-
tory Problem in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 949, 950 (2004) (suggesting anti-
trust courts should pay closer attention to agency issues when evaluating the
conduct of the buyer in health care).
266 See El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 612, 627
(S.D. Tex. 2003); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
122–29 (1982) (arguing that congressional debates over the Sherman Act con-
demned trusts and monopolies because they had enough power to unfairly ex-
tract wealth from consumers); Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust
Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 959, 961–62 (1999).
267 Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the
Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 615 (2002).
268 Before managed care devolved into insurer-provider bargaining toward the
end of the 1990s, hospital companies such as Humana developed or acquired
insurance businesses, which they operated alongside their provider businesses as
a vertical integration strategy. See David G. Knott, Vertical Integration: 80’s Fad
or Health Care’s Future?, in STRATEGY & BUSINESS (1997), (noting that health care
companies, including Humana, attempted to vertically integrate by acquiring hos-
pitals); Hammer & Sage, supra note 267, at 567.  After the public backlash R
against that generation of managed care, integration receded as a corporate goal
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Similarly, the distinction between vertical and horizontal
agreements under established antitrust law needs to be refined
if it is to be correctly applied in health care.  The FTC has
claimed that ACO-based systems such as Medicare’s Pioneer
and Shared Savings Programs envision mainly “vertical” inte-
gration between hospitals and physicians, not “horizontal” con-
solidation of hospitals.269  However, this mischaracterizes the
physician-hospital relationship and shortchanges the potential
efficiency gains from new financing and delivery models.  Hos-
pitals are not suppliers to physicians, nor are physicians sales
agents for hospitals—both typical vertical relationships.
Rather, physicians and hospitals are coproducers of acute and
complex medical care.  Although collaboration between them
could be beneficial, they could as easily compete with each
other to deliver that care as medical organizations and prod-
ucts change.
4. Unilateral Effects and Status Quo Bias
Unlike earlier versions, the enforcement agencies’ 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines emphasize the “unilateral effects”
of mergers more than their “coordinated effects.”270  Collusion
is easier among fewer competitors (oligopoly), as is so-called
conscious parallelism, which is why concentrated industries
tend to be less competitive.271  A merger’s “coordinated effects”
are a measure of how much more likely it is that the remaining
competitors will act as a cartel.272  By contrast, a merger’s
“unilateral effects” are a measure of whether consumers are
likely to be disadvantaged by the elimination of competition
between the merging parties, regardless of other market par-
ticipants.273  Since the 1990s, antitrust economists have devel-
oped increasingly sophisticated (and expensive) modeling tools
and the insurer and hospital businesses were separated again, for fear that unaf-
filiated hospitals (who had gained influence) would refuse to do business with an
insurer connected to a rival hospital system.
269 See Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 15–22, F.T.C. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 2012 WL 1144620 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5,
2012) (No. 11–cv–50344), 2011 WL 6917813; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice &
Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding
Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011).
270 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, at 20. R
271 There are many duopolies that are fiercely competitive, sometimes because
the rivalry between the two companies has acquired a personal dimension. See
id.; Erwin A. Blackstone et al., The Case of Duopoly: Industry Structure is Not a
Sufficient Basis for Imposing Regulation, 34 REG. 12, 17 (2012).
272 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, at 2. R
273 Id. at 20.
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to demonstrate potential harm from consolidation, including
by estimating unilateral effects.274
One problem with unilateral effects analysis is that it bi-
ases the evidence toward past events even if the market envi-
ronment is changing rapidly, as is the case today in the health
care system.  Whether a market will be more collusive in the
future requires assessing the commercial conditions that are
likely to prevail in the future, as well as incorporating any
evidence that exists of past collusion.  However, only historical
data on competition between the merging parties is sufficiently
comprehensive to feed the econometric models that estimate
unilateral effects.  For example, these models use such data to
estimate the amount of business that each hospital would lose
to the other should it raise prices as an indicator of whether a
merger between them would eliminate an important source of
market discipline.275
The other problem with unilateral effects analysis is that it
often substitutes for defining markets with precision when
evaluating a merger of two large competitors.  In fact, the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines de-emphasized product market
definition because unilateral effects tests seem to directly mea-
sure diminished competition following a merger.276  To the ex-
tent that agencies and courts are persuaded by critical loss
analysis and similar econometric models, they may no longer
require exact definitions of either product or geographic mar-
274 Examples include willingness to pay (WTP) and diversion analysis, which
are simulation-based methods that model patient flows and fee negotiations be-
tween health plans and the merging institutions.  WTP is the maximum amount
an individual is willing to pay for services considering the other available hospi-
tals.  Amiram Gafni, Willingness to Pay: What’s in a Name?, 14
PHARMACOECONOMICS 465, 470 (1998).  Diversion analysis evaluates the degree to
which the merging facilities are each other’s closest competitors. Subramaniam
Ramanarayanan, Diversion Analysis as Applied to Hospital Mergers: A Primer,
NERA June 24, 2014 (http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/
archive2/PUB_Diversion_Analysis_Hospital_Mergers_0614.pdf).  Another
method, critical loss analysis, which identifies for a given price increase the
amount of sales that can be lost before the price increase becomes unprofitable,
has been criticized.  Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analy-
sis of Critical Loss Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 161, 161 (2003).
275 O’Brien & Wickelgren, supra note 274, at 163–164. R
276 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, at 21 (“Where R
sufficient data are available, the Agencies may construct economic models de-
signed to quantify the unilateral price effects resulting from the merger. . . .  These
merger simulation methods need not rely on market definition.”).  Thus far, courts
appear skeptical. See, e.g., Golden Gate Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
C–09–3854 MMC, 2010 WL 1541257 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010), aff’d, 433 F. App’x
598 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing a complaint for a wide and unspecific product
market definition).
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kets.277  This may not be problematic in many industries, but
in health care it allows both enforcers and decision makers to
ignore the artificiality of what pass for products today as well as
what might be different in the future.278
Current investigative practices by the enforcement agen-
cies similarly bias enforcement toward the status quo.  There is
often a long preinvestigation phase, during which agencies
contact both the merging parties and others in the community,
aggressively elicit detailed testimony from current market par-
ticipants, and gather large volumes of competitively sensitive
historical data for their econometric models.279  Among other
things, this approach may induce those interviewed to present
a more fixed view of the market than circumstances actually
warrant, and it may undervalue entry and innovation.
B. Antitrust Enforcement Actions and Product
Improvement
What forms of anticompetitive conduct most hinder prod-
uct improvement in health care?  There are two major catego-
ries of disputes in which antitrust enforcement is likely to have
beneficial effects.  First are cases involving private exclusionary
conduct.280  The activity challenged in these cases has one ob-
jective: maintaining the status quo.281  If health care providers
lack a habit of selling assembled products, maybe new compet-
itors—or at least the threat of new competitors—might instill it.
Antitrust enforcement can help ensure that these competitors
have a fair chance, both to compete as a general matter and to
serve particular customers and communities.
Second are situations involving the aggregation of provid-
ers or services into groups, the stated purpose of which is to
improve quality or efficiency.  As Adam Smith recognized cen-
turies ago, gatherings of competitors constitute an invitation to
277 J. Douglas Richards, Is Market Definition Necessary in Sherman Act Cases
When Anticompetitive Effects Can Be Shown with Direct Evidence?, 26 ANTITRUST
53, 54–55 (2012).
278 See supra text accompanying notes 154–56. R
279 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 4 (2000) (noting procedures for initial
examinations of mergers and subsequent investigations) [hereinafter “ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS”].
280 Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 527, 532 (2013) (recognizing exclusion as a core concern of competition
policy).
281 See Hammer & Sage, supra note 267 at, 630 (noting that strict limitation of R
standing to traditional customers and competitors in an industry will favor the
status quo).
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behave anticompetitively.282  In health care, however, physi-
cians have been so atomized for so long—and so separated
from hospitals—that they need time and space to learn to work
together.  In these situations, therefore, antitrust enforcers
need to be sensitive to context in order to judge whether a
particular aggregation is likely to succeed in bringing providers
together to construct assembled products, or whether it is
more likely to turn collusive or exclusionary.
1. Exclusionary Conduct Cases
Antitrust enforcement to prevent the exclusion of sellers
from markets is an important part of promoting product im-
provement.  Although antitrust laws protect competition as a
whole, not individual competitors, it will be hard to move to-
ward assembled health care products if potentially “disruptive”
innovators find themselves excluded from the boat for rocking
it.283  This is not to say that any party should have open access
to contracting partners or that established resources consti-
tute “essential facilities.”284  To the contrary, producing an as-
sembled product may well require greater rather than less
exclusivity.  However, given the historically constrained pat-
terns of buying and selling health care products that currently
prevail, making sure that new competitors can get a foot in the
door is important.
a. Professional Boards and Purported State Action
Obstacles to product improvement in health care may be
exacerbated by the intransigence of professional licensing bod-
ies, which are authorized by state law but function as industry
self-regulators.285  Assembled health care products require
standardized production, organization and teamwork, warran-
282 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 117 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1910) (“People
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices.”).
283 Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Innovation (2015), http://www.clayton
christensen.com/key-concepts/ [http://perma.cc/68NG-BV3V] (describing a
process by which a product or service takes root initially in simple applications at
the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves up market, eventually dis-
placing established competitors).
284 Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust
Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 462 (2002) (noting that essential facilities doctrine is
applied cautiously in lower courts pursuant to limiting principles).
285 See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Li-
censed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97
(2014) (noting that licensing agencies often insulate incumbents from
competition).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 62 16-MAR-16 15:47
670 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:609
ties for poor quality, and continuous innovation in response to
consumer preferences.  Health professional licensing bodies,
especially state boards of medicine, represent the opposite val-
ues: professional discretion, generous payment, individual
physician control, accountability only for egregious harm, and
practice set by habit and tradition under the guise of ethics.
Scholarly criticism of occupational licensing, previously
associated mainly with libertarian thought, is becoming signifi-
cantly broader.286  Because most members of licensing bodies
are selected from the profession they oversee, they tend to
guard their professional turf and view most issues through the
lens of their own training and practice.  They understand their
job as protecting the public, but they seldom offer the public a
strong or direct voice.  As a result, it is the rare professional
board that acts contrary to the economic interests of its licen-
sees.  Nor do they tend to work cooperatively with licensing
boards for other professions, even those that are engaged in
service to the same clientele.
A recent upturn in federal antitrust challenges to anticom-
petitive conduct by professional licensing boards is a positive
sign for product enhancement in health care.  A watershed
case is North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,287
which was decided by the United States Supreme Court in
early 2015. North Carolina Board involved cease-and-desist
letters sent by a state dental board to nondentist sellers of
teeth whitening services, as well as to owners of the shopping
malls where many such businesses are located.288  The letters
advised them, without any formal legal determination under
the Board’s statutory authority, that their activities constituted
the unlicensed practice of dentistry and could be prosecuted as
286 Professional licensing boards, especially the powerful medical boards con-
trolled by physicians, have attracted criticism from conservative economists for
decades.  Milton Friedman wrote in 1962, “I am . . . persuaded that [restrictive]
licensure has reduced both the quantity and quality of medical practice; . . . that it
has forced the public to pay more for less satisfactory medical service, and that it
has retarded technological development both in medicine itself and in the organi-
zation of medical practice.” MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 149–59
(1962). See also Edlin & Haw, supra note 285, at 1094 (contending that the state R
action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits against state licensing boards
that are comprised of private competitors); Alexander Volokh, The New Private-
Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 933 (2014) (suggesting useful tools to challenge self-
interested private regulation).
287 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1101 (2015), aff’g N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC,
717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013).
288 See id. at 1109.
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a crime.289  FTC’s Bureau of Competition challenged this col-
lective conduct as an unfair trade practice by representatives of
the private dental profession, and its internal adjudicatory rul-
ing was upheld on appeal by the Fourth Circuit.290  Affirming
that decision, the Supreme Court held categorically that pro-
fessional boards and other state agencies controlled by current
market participants could not claim state action immunity un-
less their conduct is actively supervised by the state itself.291
This holding may have lasting benefits for competitive entry in
professional services, much of which should involve assembled
products that appeal to consumers.
b. Excluding Rival Professions
If health care products are to improve, it is important that
professionals with diverse training, skills, priorities, and ways
of doing things be allowed access to health care markets.  How-
ever, physicians often have discouraged both competition and
innovation by excluding other classes of health professionals or
nonprofessional actors from providing health care services.292
Often this is done through state legislation or the actions of
licensing boards described above.  But it can also be attempted
in private, particularly in connection with limiting the classes
of provider who receive hospital privileges or are permitted to
join managed care networks.293  In the latter case, insurers
may be complicit in imposing restrictions because admitting
new types of professionals would likely expand the number and
variety of disaggregated process steps that they are obligated to
cover and finance.
Most litigated cases have been brought by private parties
and have involved longstanding professional rivalries, such as
between orthopedic physicians and chiropractors, or between
physician ophthalmologists and optometrists.  In American
Chiropractic Association v. Trigon Healthcare Inc., a chiropractic
group sued Virginia’s largest health insurance company, claim-
289 Id.
290 See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 375.
291 The Supreme Court had previously addressed the state action doctrine in
2013, holding unanimously that a Georgia public hospital’s acquisition of its
principal rival was not authorized by state law in a manner that shielded it from
antitrust scrutiny. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003,
1007 (2013).
292 See Philip C. Kissam, Government Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and
Certification: The Antitrust Laws and Other Procompetitive Strategies, 1983 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 7–12 (1983).
293 See Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 594
(8th Cir. 2009).
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ing it conspired with its advisory committee of physicians and
“created false referral guidelines meant to limit the usage of
chiropractors for the treatment of lower back pain.”294  In Abra-
ham v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., a group of optometrists
sued an integrated delivery system that includes both hospitals
and managed care plans, alleging that it conspired with oph-
thalmologists “to exclude optometrists as a class” from provid-
ing nonsurgical eye care services to enrollees.295  These private
complaints have seldom succeeded in court,296 but the anti-
trust agencies should be alert to situations involving dominant
insurers and large groups of favored practitioners.
c. Excluding Specialty Hospitals and Their Physician-
Owners
“Specialty hospitals” have been plaintiffs in several recent
antitrust disputes.297  These cases typically involve allegations
that traditional hospitals conspired together and with health
insurers to keep a physician-owned hospital out of the mar-
ket.298  As one court noted, these cases
ultimately involve[ ] the proper place of physician-owned
healthcare ventures in the broad landscape of United States
healthcare.  Both sides insist they solely possess the moral
high ground . . . [but n]either side can make a colorable
argument that the parties’ profits is not a central factor in
their dispute.299
294 367 F.3d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the claim on the ground that a
corporation cannot conspire with itself, and deeming the committee its corporate
agent).
295 461 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006) (dismissing the claims for lack of
standing or antitrust injury).
296 See id. at 1266.
297 See, e.g., Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Premier Health Partners, 294
F.R.D. 87, 87-88 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“[P]hysician-owned hospital . . . alleg[ed] that
defendants coerced commercial health insurers to refuse plaintiff full access to
their networks and that defendants coerced insurers to provide reimbursement
rates below market and below the rates defendants demanded for the same ser-
vices.”); Rome Ambulatory Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Rome Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 349 F.
Supp. 2d 389, 389 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[A]mbulatory surgical facility that went out of
business sued non-profit community hospital, alleging antitrust violations under
Sherman Act.”).
298 See supra note 294–95. R
299 Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 527 F. Supp.
2d 1257, 1264 (D. Kan. 2007) (denying summary judgment in a suit by a physi-
cian-owned hospital offering orthopedic, neurological, plastic, and general sur-
gery, as well as pain management, against two managed care organizations and
four hospitals). But see Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591
F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (dismissing claims that the largest hospital com-
pany and the largest insurer in Arkansas conspired “to restrain trade in, and
monopolize the market for, cardiology services for privately insured patients” by
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While the majority of these cases are brought privately, and
none have been initiated by the DOJ or FTC, at least one case
involved public enforcement.300  In Texas v. Memorial Hermann
Healthcare System, the state attorney general filed suit against
a major hospital system, alleging it discouraged health insur-
ers from doing business with Houston Town and Country Hos-
pital by threatening to terminate contracts with, or impose
substantial rate increases on, health plans that contracted
with the physician-owned facility.301
Specialty hospitals represent a mixed blessing for improv-
ing the products sold in health care markets.  On one hand,
evidence exists that these physician-owned businesses may
cherry-pick lucrative procedures on well-insured patients,
leaving community hospitals fewer resources with which to fi-
nance comprehensive services and care for the uninsured.302
For these reasons, the federal government placed a three-year
moratorium on specialty hospitals in the early 2000s,303 which
was essentially made permanent by changes to federal fraud
and abuse law in the ACA.304
On the other hand, provider organizations with strong phy-
sician leadership and a commitment to excellence in a limited
number of services are more likely to offer them on an assem-
bled basis for a competitive price.305  It is therefore likely that
federal law will change again in the future to allow physician-
owned specialty hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, and
other integrated clinical organizations receiving bundled pay-
ments to compete against traditional community hospitals.
revoking a cardiology group’s admitting privileges and in-network contract after it
launched a new heart hospital).
300 See Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Texas v. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys.,
(No. 2009–04609) (2009).
301 Id.
302 See Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Focused Factories? Physician-Owned Spe-
cialty Facilities, 22 HEALTH AFF. 56, 67 (2003) (describing the recent increase in
physician-owned specialty hospitals, reasons for this increase, possible impacts,
and potential policy options).
303 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108–173, § 117, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
304 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 6001,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
305 See SURGERY CTR. OF OKLA., Surgery Pricing (2015), http://www.surgery
centerok.com/pricing/ [http://perma.cc/A45F-8SX7]; see generally REGINA E.
HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 157–99 (1997) (hypothesizing that
integrated delivery systems will give way to “focused factories” that offer all the
care needed to treat a particular disease).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 66 16-MAR-16 15:47
674 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:609
d. Contractual Entrenchment
Close scrutiny of provider-insurer arrangements that deter
competitive entry on one or both sides of the payment relation-
ship is an important part of competition policy.  Health care
products cannot be efficiently assembled and sold without con-
tractual flexibility.306  Longstanding control by the medical pro-
fession, which traditionally assumed privileges and obligations
based on status, led the health care system to underuse con-
tracts for most of its history.307
However, contracts involving dominant players in current
health care markets can deter entry by new competitors and
consequent innovation by making the business opportunities
they cover less contestable.  Economist Fiona Scott Morton de-
scribes these as “contracts that reference rivals.”308  Antitrust
enforcers should scrutinize these contracts for unreasonable
restraints of trade that exclude potential competitors on either
side of the transaction.
It is tempting to think of a health insurer as a motivated
purchaser of medical care, but insurers are imperfect agents
for policyholders and for the private employers who sponsor
most health coverage.309  Unlike physicians, who tend to work
through licensing boards or professional groups to exclude un-
welcome competitors, health insurers and hospitals are corpo-
rate organizations that more often erect barriers to competition
as part of their private business agreements.310
In some cases, an insurer or provider alleges that another
provider and insurer have entered into an agreement that ex-
cludes it but sues only its direct competitor.  The counterparty
to the agreement is seen as grudgingly participating to ensure
that it is not harmed.  In other cases, insurers and providers
seem to be willfully working together for their mutual benefit,
306 See Dranove & Ludwick supra note 183. R
307 Compare CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 250 (1995) (outlining how innovative health care
contracts can be structured to provide varied levels of coverage and pricing in
order to allow real choice in benefits and costs, rather than letting the federal
government dictate the degree of insurance one must purchase), with HENRY
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861) (positing a general transition of legal obligations from
status in ancient societies to contract in modern ones).
308 Fiona M. Scott Morton, Contracts that Reference Rivals, 27 ANTITRUST 72, 72
(2013) (defining such contracts as “a contract between a buyer and a seller that
refers to, and whose terms may depend on, information outside this ‘standard’
buyer-seller contractual relationship . . . [based on] information . . . from other
transactions to which those same firms are . . . party.” (emphasis added)).
309 See Hammer & Sage, supra note 267. R
310 See supra notes 297–99. R
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and both parties are sued by the excluded rival.311  Most anti-
trust cases that arise from these situations are brought by
private plaintiffs, but public enforcement also plays an impor-
tant role.312
DOMINANT INSURERS AND MFNS. Large incumbent firms can
use “most-favored-customer” clauses (also called “most-fa-
vored-nation” clauses or MFNs) to discourage vendors from
price discounting to smaller competitors or potential entrants,
which may also deter quality-based competition and product
innovation.  This is a common tactic among large medical and
dental insurers in their provider agreements with hospitals and
health professionals.313  Traditionally, courts regarded MFNs
as “standard devices by which buyers try to bargain for low
prices” and therefore procompetitive.314  However, some courts
have recognized the potential for MFNs to facilitate carteliza-
tion among sellers and increase prices, or—with the most di-
rect consequences for innovation—to raise costs for potential
market entrants.315  The weight of recent opinion is critical of
MFNs, which is good news for competition policymakers at-
tempting to dislodge entrenched parties and encourage new
competitors who are more likely to offer better products.
Three lawsuits have been brought against Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Michigan for its use of MFN clauses in contracts with
hospitals, with the first filed by the DOJ in 2010.316  At the
time, the defendant’s health plans covered 60% of Michigan’s
311 See, e.g., West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 100
(3d Cir. 2010).
312 As a matter of agency jurisdiction, these cases are typically brought by the
DOJ, not the FTC. See, e.g., United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 809 F.
Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss Sherman Act case
against dominant health insurer for including “most-favored-customer” clauses
in contracts with hospitals); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Depart-
ment Reaches Settlement with Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Con-
tracts with Health Insurers (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2011/267648.htm [https://perma.cc/78S7-LCC5] (litigation
against dominant hospital for entering into contracts with health insurer that
prohibit dealing with other hospitals).
313 See, e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
314 Blue Cross Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415
(7th Cir. 1995) (stating that MFN clauses do not, as a matter of law, violate the
Sherman Act).
315 See United States v. Delta Dental of Rhode Island, 943 F. Supp. 172, 192
(D.R.I. 1996) (“The net effect is an alleged detrimental impact on the dental market
without any discernible competitive benefits.”).
316 See Blue Cross Blue Shield, 809 F. Supp. 2d.  Additional suits based on the
same facts were filed by a competing insurer, Aetna Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield,
No. 11–CV–15346, 2013 WL 1831320 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2012), and by a class
of individuals and business that purchased health insurance, Shane Grp., Inc. v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 10-14360, 2012 WL 5990219 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30,
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commercially insured population, and it had agreements con-
taining MFNs with over 40% of Michigan’s general acute care
hospitals.317  The hospitals were seen as having little choice
and were not sued; the court’s opinions suggest that a hospital
that declined to sign would have been paid up to 16% less by
Blue Cross.318  The State of Michigan subsequently enacted
laws banning the use of MFNs by the health insurance
industry.319
DOMINANT HOSPITALS. Large hospitals may also disadvan-
tage potential rivals by contract.  In Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc.
v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, a smaller for-profit hospi-
tal alleged that a nonprofit facility forced health insurers to
deal with it only.320  Palmyra claimed that “Phoebe Putney lev-
erage[s] its monopoly power over the medical services requiring
[certificates of need] to force Blue Cross (and other insurers) to
exclude Palmyra from their provider networks” for all services,
in violation of the Clayton Act’s prohibition on tying arrange-
ments.321  Reversing the lower court, the Eleventh Circuit held
Palmyra had antitrust standing to sue.322  In United States v.
United Regional Health Care System of Wichita Falls, Texas,323
the DOJ and the Texas attorney general brought suit to enjoin
United Regional from inserting terms into contracts with insur-
ers that prevented those insurers from contracting with its
competitors.324  United Regional had a market share of approx-
imately 90% for inpatient hospital services and 65% for outpa-
tient hospital services, and insurers unwilling to contract
exclusively with it paid substantially more for services.325
MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. Breaking up cozy relationships that
keep out other competitors is a valuable aspect of antitrust
enforcement.  Large providers and large insurers have a mu-
tual interest in maintaining the status quo.  In particular, the
notion of “must-have” hospitals in insurance networks has in-
vited dealmaking that is almost certainly adverse to consum-
ers.  The infamous “handshake in the snow,” for example,
resolved a standoff between Partners HealthCare in Boston and
2012).  In each case the District Court denied Blue Cross’s motion to dismiss,
finding that the plaintiffs met the requirements for antitrust standing.
317 Blue Cross Blue Shield, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 668–69.
318 Id. at 669.
319 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 4, 5.
320 604 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2010).
321 Id. at 1296.
322 Id. at 1303.
323 No. 7:11CV00030, 2011 WL 846762 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011).
324 Id. at *17.
325 Id. at *12–14.
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Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts but did not secure
any competitive gains for the market.326
Another example is Western Pennsylvania, which has ex-
perienced over a decade of contractual maneuvering intended
to keep new competitors out of the market.  Private health care
in Pittsburgh and environs has long been dominated by the
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), which owns a
majority of the hospital beds and employs a very large number
of physicians, and by Highmark, a nonprofit health insurer
that combines the former Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans of
western Pennsylvania.327  The second-largest hospital organi-
zation in the area is West Penn Allegheny Health System
(WAHS), a combination of several smaller hospitals.328  In the
early 2000s, Highmark attempted to undermine UPMC’s domi-
nant position by providing a large loan to WAHS and setting up
a low-cost insurance option that paid hospitals less than
UPMC, but not WAHS, was willing to accept.329  UPMC re-
sponded by creating its own health plan to compete against
Highmark.330
In 2005, however, Highmark and UPMC began to act more
like allies.  UPMC refused to discount fees for hospital services
to other health plans that were considering entering the Penn-
sylvania market, and Highmark increased its reimbursement
rates to UPMC.331  UPMC scaled back its own health plan, and
Highmark shut down its low-cost insurance option that had
not included UPMC.332  Highmark declined to refinance its loan
to WAHS, and UPMC began a systematic effort to hire away
several of WAHS’s best physicians.333  WAHS eventually filed
an antitrust suit against UPMC and Highmark that paints a
clear picture of Highmark and UPMC “[conspiring] to protect
one another from competition.”334  Subsequent market devel-
opments have been ratified by state regulators but have not
increased competition.335
326 Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, A Handshake that Made Healthcare
History, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2008, at A1, A14.
327 West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 91–92 (3d
Cir. 2010).
328 Id. at 92.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 93.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 94.
334 Id. at 91 (denying motion to dismiss).
335 In 2011, while still in litigation, Highmark changed its strategy and part-
ners yet again, and it offered to become affiliated with WAHS.  WAHS accepted the
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2. Joint Production or Pricing Cases
The second major category of antitrust cases important to
inducing the development of assembled products involves the
process of production and associated pricing.  Full corporatiza-
tion of health care delivery with employed, salaried physicians
may be years away, if it comes at all.  For the foreseeable fu-
ture, then, there cannot be a sizable complement of assembled
products unless independent economic actors come together to
produce them and to negotiate their sale.
Not surprisingly, collective activity of this sort may raise
concerns regarding its anticompetitive potential.  The FTC web-
site provides a list of all the agency’s health care antitrust
actions since 1996.336  Of 190 cases the agency initiated, 33
(17%) were collective bargaining or horizontal price-fixing cases
filed in 2000 or later, typically involving joint pricing by physi-
cians of their own services.337  Unlike exclusion cases, how-
ever, which typically require more aggressive enforcement,
joint production or joint pricing cases may require less aggres-
sive, or at least more selective, enforcement if assembled prod-
ucts are to develop.
a. “Clinical Integration” and New Products
In the early years of managed care, it often proved difficult
to persuade physicians in private practice to bear financial risk
when joining a new contracting intermediary such as an inde-
pendent practice association.338  Because joint price negotia-
tion by physicians who did not share substantial financial risk
offer. Press Release—Highmark, West Penn Allegheny Health System (WPAHS)
and WPAHS Bondholder Representatives Reach an Agreement that Positions the
Health System for Financial Stability, HIGHMARK (Jan. 16, 2013), https://
www.highmark.com/hmk2/newsroom/2013/pr011613.shtml [http://perma.cc/
CCU2-BAMJ].  After undergoing regulatory review, the transaction received ap-
proval from the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance, subject to certain condi-
tions.  Pennsylvania Insurance Dep’t, Opinion Letter on West Penn Allegheny
Health System entering into a $700,000,000 term loan and the guaranty by
Highmark Inc. of that term loan (May 20, 2014).




338 See Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A
Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y
& L. 75, 83 (1993) (offering a taxonomy of managed care organizations).
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was considered a per se violation of the Sherman Act,339 physi-
cian networks faced a significant barrier to formation.
Since the mid-1990s, the antitrust agencies have permit-
ted independent physicians who participate in provider net-
works and are “clinically integrated” to jointly negotiate fees
with insurers without it automatically constituting unlawful
price fixing.340  Clinical integration was rationalized by the en-
forcement agencies as akin to offering a new product, which
might justify joint pricing even without shared financial risk.341
However, nothing approximating the delivery of assembled
products—which would be indisputably “new”—has been de-
manded of physicians.342  Instead, the agencies have accepted
a variety of joint investments in quality or efficiency of care as
clinical integration, such as shared health information sys-
tems, common treatment protocols, and uniform processes for
reviewing the quality and cost-effectiveness of care.343
Going forward, the enforcement agencies should narrow
the clinical integration exception, obligating providers who are
not sharing financial risk to demonstrate that they have re-
engineered care to create assembled products and have mea-
sured outcomes associated with those products.  Much as
prices should relate to complete services, not isolated inputs,
quality benchmarks should represent actual utility, not techni-
cal details that at best represent minor contributors to the
ultimate success of care.344
339 See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (holding
maximum–fee agreements for physician services to be per se unlawful under the
Sherman Act).
340 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 90–91 (1996), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/0000.htm [http://perma.cc/DA4Z-H6NX]; Letter from Fed.
Trade Comm’n to John J. Miles, Esquire, Counsel for MedSouth Inc. 1–2 (Jun. 18,
2007), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-opinions/
medsouth-inc./070618medsouth.pdf [http://perma.cc/LE4Q-AZX5] [hereinafter
“STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996”].
341 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23  (1979)
(holding the issuance of blanket licenses does not constitute price fixing per se
unlawful under the antitrust laws because, in part, blanket licenses are a new
product).
342 See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 39 R
n.275.
343 See STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note 340, at R
111.
344 See generally William M. Sage et al., Why Competition Law Matters to
Health Care Quality, 22 HEALTH AFF. 31, 34–36 (2003) (surveying the ways compe-
tition law and policy have affected quality-based competition in health care).
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b. Product Bundling
Because large providers and large insurers have a mutual
interest in maintaining the status quo, the challenge for com-
petition policymakers is to distinguish insurer-provider trans-
actions that make products more useful for patients from
transactions that shelter existing businesses from competitive
threats.  For example, insurers often require hospitals with
which they contract to negotiate fees for all of their services
simultaneously, instead of as single services or in discrete
groups.345  One interpretation of this practice is that insurers
are assembling products to be sold to policyholders, and that
less than comprehensive services and associated coverage
would have lower value for consumers.
The problem is that a large hospital able to do business on
these terms becomes a “must-have” for health insurance net-
works, conferring economic benefits on large hospitals that are
not available to smaller hospitals.346  And insurers that prove
their ability to negotiate comprehensively over fees acquire sim-
ilarly special cachet with their employer clients.  This can hap-
pen notwithstanding the fact that unassembled services are
still unassembled services, even if they all appear on a single
list of negotiated prices.  Although packaged treatments for epi-
sodes of care will usually improve competition, “bundles” of
per-service fees not tied to the treatment of any particular ill-
ness may render markets less contestable by preventing com-
petitors from offering more limited, but lower-priced or higher-
quality alternatives.347
c. ACOs and Provider Bottlenecks
As with bundling of covered services into all-or-nothing
aggregates, having physicians contract exclusively with a sin-
gle managed care network or other integrated organization may
either improve the products offered to consumers or erect a
barrier to competition.  The DOJ and FTC favor nonexclusive
contracts, particularly for medical specialists, under which
physicians who agree to provide services to one insurer or in-
345 See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly
Problem in Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847, 876 (2011) (noting “hospitals’ practice
of negotiating a comprehensive pricing formula for large bundles of their services”
with purchasers like insurance companies).
346 See id. at 853 (suggesting that large hospitals with greater market power
enjoy a competitive advantage).
347 See id. at 876 (suggesting that antitrust enforcers should require hospitals
to unbundle services to allow purchasers to negotiate lower fees).
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termediary organization still may serve other insurers or orga-
nizations as well.348
The theory behind physician nonexclusivity is that exclu-
sive contracting deters entry by new insurers hoping to form
their own networks because existing providers have been
“locked up.”349  Exclusivity also aggregates physicians into
groups that might themselves gain market power over consum-
ers.350  From the perspective of assembled products, however,
context matters.  If physicians are simply fungible inputs to
insurance networks, nonexclusivity may be preferable in order
to prevent bottlenecks in supply from forming.  If physician
commitment drives performance, however, exclusive relation-
ships may be more conducive to meeting industrial standards
for quality and reliability, and therefore may enable provider
organizations to develop assembled products that are more
rather than less competitive.
This question has been important to the antitrust guidance
the DOJ and FTC offer to Accountable Care Organizations
(ACOs).  Medicare’s “shared-savings” ACO model rewards phy-
sician-hospital partnerships that meet quality benchmarks at
lower cost than traditional, fee-for-service Medicare.351  ACOs
enable physicians and hospitals to work together more effi-
ciently because of greater transparency, stronger accountabil-
ity metrics, and better-designed incentives.352  Accordingly,
ACO theorists endorse competition among ACOs in communi-
ties that can support more than one ACO, but do not assume
that each existing hospital in a community will draw primary
care physicians into orbit around it and survive only on the
specialized business they refer.353
348 See Greaney, supra note 29, at 71. R
349 See id. at 74.
350 Even physicians who have the right to contract with several organizations
may not do so, particularly if they are earning high fees because of the market
power inherent in their existing organization. See id. at 77–78 (discussing the
failure of enforcement agencies and the courts to influence hospital organizational
structure).
351 See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable
Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011).
352 See id. at 67,8104, 67,810, 67,804.
353 That model had failed in the early 1990s.  Managed care organizations had
instituted crude “gatekeeping” requirements to reduce direct access to physician
specialists.  Hospitals responded by building satellite clinics and acquiring pri-
mary care practices to keep the patients coming anyway. See GEORGE B. MOSELEY,
III, MANAGED CARE STRATEGIES: A PHYSICIAN PRACTICE DESK REFERENCE 130 (1st ed.
1999) (recommending the use of primary care physicians as “gatekeepers” to
specialist referrals and opening satellite clinics in response to the demands of
managed care organizations).
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The enforcement agencies initially proposed requiring
Medicare ACOs exceeding certain physician participation
thresholds to obtain antitrust preclearance but retreated from
that position in the final rule.354  Still, ACOs need to be more
than “good guys” bearing insurance risk, like the stillborn “pro-
vider-sponsored organizations” that politicians supported as
physician-led alternatives to commercial HMOs in the
1990s.355  Antitrust enforcers evaluating ACOs therefore
should urge them to design and deliver assembled products,
and should work with regulators to institute systems of pay-
ment based on the value to patients of the specific products
ACOs offer as well as on the aggregate savings they generate for
Medicare.
d. Price Information
Because assembled products will not be developed unless
patients demand them, better consumer information is essen-
tial if they are to become marketable.  When private sellers
share information about pricing in real time, however, antitrust
enforcers worry that it will facilitate price fixing.356  The agen-
cies’ 1996 joint Policy Statement on Antitrust Enforcement in
the Healthcare Industry both acknowledges the competitive
benefits of information and attaches conditions to private shar-
ing.357  Although the DOJ has issued favorable business review
letters to payers sharing hospital costs among themselves and
with providers,358 the agencies also have signaled their concern
354 See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable
Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76
Fed. Reg. at 67,026–32.
355 See Edward Hirshfeld, Assuring the Solvency of Provider-Sponsored Organi-
zations, HEALTH AFF., 1996, at 28, 29–30 (discussing solvency risks).
356 See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 41. R
357 See STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note 340, at R
55–57.  The agencies agreed not to take action if the information was (1) managed
by a third party, (2) based on data more than three months old, (3) aggregated
from at least five providers, (4) not including more than 25% of any single pro-
vider’s business, and (5) not identifiable to any individual provider.
358 See Letter from Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Mit Spears, Esquire, Counsel for Ropes & Gray LLP (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/258013.htm [http://perma.cc/
V9XJ-7TCV] (Department of Justice  Business Review Letter on “value indices”);
see also Letter from William J. Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Colin R. Kass, Esquire, Counsel for Proskauer Rose LLP (Jan. 16, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/291451.htm [http://perma.cc/RM9W-
DDZ4] (Department of Justice  Business Review Letter on gainsharing).
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about potential collusion arising from information sharing in
other industries.359
Economic theory holds that a market with very similar
pricing across competitors can be collusive, but it can also be
perfectly competitive.  Health care remains inefficient in part
because prices paid in past transactions are often kept se-
cret.360  On balance, it seems likely that opaque or incoherent
pricing has caused more harm to competition in health care
than could plausibly result from greater transparency.  Absent
unusual circumstances, therefore, antitrust enforcers should
be open to information sharing and should encourage prices
for comparable, useful products and services to become as
readily available to consumers in health care as in other
industries.
Reduced price discrimination is another potential benefit
of price transparency, especially for assembled products.  Legal
prohibitions on price discrimination under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act do not apply to service markets,361 and antitrust law
has generally favored unconstrained bargaining between buy-
ers and sellers.362  In health care, however, the relationship
between prices and underlying costs has been obscured by
third-party payment, fragmented care delivery, and traditions
of shifting expense from price-sensitive to price-insensitive
buyers.363  Each health care provider charges a range of prices
to different customers, typically offering substantial discounts
to health insurers and charging self-pay patients full freight.364
For disaggregated products, this variation not only reflects
each provider’s uneven bargaining power vis-à-vis particular
payers but also suggests that many providers have a less-than-
359 See In re Sigma Corp., FTC File No. 101 0080 (2012), http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/1010080/index.shtm [http://perma.cc/5ZZC-BNQN] (consent de-
cree involving the three major U.S. suppliers of ductile iron fittings).
360 See Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health Care Uniquely
Inefficient?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 28 (2008) (“The fundamental cause is a combi-
nation of high prices for inputs, poorly restrained incentives for overutilization,
and a tendency to adopt expensive medical innovations rapidly, even when evi-
dence of effectiveness is weak or absent.”); Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs:
Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce Health Care Spending?, 4 WM. & MARY
POL’Y REV. 319, 323 (2013) (noting that a lack of transparency regarding health
care may contribute to higher prices).
361 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936).
362 See supra notes 266–67. R
363 See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 19, 35; R
Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry, supra note 203, at 9. R
364 Under the ACA, federally tax-exempt hospitals may not collect amounts
from uninsured individuals exceeding what the hospitals would have collected
from a typical private insurer.
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firm grasp of the cost of producing their services.365  Nondis-
criminatory pricing for basic medical services therefore may
have competitive benefits, encouraging providers to investigate
and optimize their cost structures, allowing consumers to com-
parison shop, and blunting the bargaining advantages cur-
rently enjoyed by large, but often unimaginative and self-
interested payers.
C. Coordinated Strategies for Improving Health Care
Products
Developing a “new normal” of improved competition to de-
liver assembled products will require deliberate alignment be-
tween antitrust enforcement and the regulatory environment
as health reform proceeds.  Federal antitrust enforcement is
often a prosecutorial enterprise, but both agencies engage in
other activities as well.  From to time, for example, the DOJ and
FTC have jointly issued industry-specific policy statements re-
garding their enforcement practices and priorities in health
care.366  The impetus for the initial set of policy statements,
released in 1993, was stakeholder uncertainty regarding the
lawfulness of new business configurations and collaborations
that might help the industry adapt to the Clinton administra-
tion’s health reform proposal.367  A similar need motivated the
guidance issued with respect to ACOs after the ACA was en-
acted, although nothing as comprehensive as the policy state-
ments of the 1990s has yet been released.
The 1993 policy statements were expanded and clarified in
1994 and 1996, painting a reasonably complete picture of how
the agencies perceived collective activity in connection with the
managed care practices of that era.368  Although the “safety
zones” identified in the 1996 statements were still relatively
narrow, they were based on greater experience with health care
and therefore did significantly more work than the 1993 state-
ments, which essentially restated then-current law in simple
365 See Robert S. Kaplan et al., Using Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing to
Identify Value-Improvement Opportunities in Healthcare, 59 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT.
399 (2014) (proposing methods for accurate cost measurement).
366 See, e.g., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS,
supra note 279; STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note R
340. R
367 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY STATEMENTS IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA 1–2 (1993).
368 See STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note 340; R
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND
ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST (1994).
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language.369  Around the same time, the FTC began issuing
advisory opinions on proposed transactions in response to in-
quiries from private parties, and the DOJ continued its similar
practice of issuing business review letters.370
In the years between the Clinton proposal and the ACA, the
agencies remained active in policy formation, generally aligning
their pronouncements with regulatory developments.  Led by
the FTC, both agencies even systematically surveyed the com-
petitive landscape of health care in the early 2000s, holding
months of hearings and publishing a book-length report.371
On the other hand, the economics-driven documents that
the agencies use to communicate some of their most important
enforcement policies are not industry specific, and they seldom
take account of the regulatory environment.  The joint venture
guidelines released in 2000, for example, clearly present the
prevailing framework for legal analysis but mention neither
direct government regulation nor professional self-regula-
tion.372  Similarly, the 2010 FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger
Guidelines instruct antitrust oversight agencies to scrutinize
the realities of competition in actual markets,373 but they use
far less regulated industries than health care to illustrate their
analytic points.374  The agencies’ caution in this regard is un-
derstandable because guidelines that set special rules for some
industries might send inaccurate messages to others.  But the
result is to deny industry participants detailed guidance about
how the agencies interpret the competitive landscape in health
care given its regulatory peculiarities.
The FTC engages the regulatory environment most directly
through its “competition advocacy” agenda.  Using hearings,
reports, and cautionary communications to state governments
and public agencies, the FTC has identified and attempted to
reduce several regulatory obstacles to health care competi-
tion.375  The successful legal challenge to the North Carolina
369 STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1996, supra note 340, at 2. R
370 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINIONS (1993–2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions [https://perma.cc/8HC6-VU9A]; U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUSINESS REVIEW LETTERS AND REQUEST LETTERS (1992–2015),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/business-review-letters-and-request-letters [http://
perma.cc/6PAH-4TV7].
371 FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 124. R
372 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 279, § 3.1. R
373 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, §§ 1–2. R
374 See, e.g., id. § 4 (providing examples relating to, among other markets,
motorcycles and glass containers).
375 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, Health Care Competition, https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/health-care-
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Board of Dental Examiners discussed above, for example, fol-
lowed a sustained effort to convey to state governments the
FTC’s concern about the misuse of state action immunity.376
Explicit collaboration between antitrust enforcers and reg-
ulators to improve health care products would be a welcomed
development in U.S. health and competition policy as the ACA
is implemented.  The coordinated statements issued in 2011 by
the antitrust agencies, fraud regulators, and the Internal Reve-
nue Service set a useful precedent for policy collaboration but
lacked a clear vision of what competition involving ACOs might
achieve.377
In designing and executing a collaborative agenda, compe-
tition policymakers should urge regulators to reimagine health
care as a dynamic terrain of contestable markets open to new
skills, organizations, and technologies, rather than regarding it
as a mature economic sector limited to an established set of
professional and institutional actors.  Among other things,
policymakers should work to dispel myths about price-quality
tradeoffs in health care that have long boosted physicians’ in-
comes and limited consumer choice.  Rather than allowing en-
trenched interests to assert without evidence the necessity of
allowing individual physicians broad discretion over the de-
ployment of complex and costly resources, policymakers
should assess the competitive consequences of relying to a
greater extent on industrial production models with standardi-
zation, quality control, and supply chain management.
Both antitrust enforcers and relevant regulators also
should explicitly connect the strategies they pursue to product
improvement.  Most important are bundled forms of provider
payment that neither reimburse disaggregated services nor
simply shift insurance risk from one level of organization to
another.  Other desirable approaches include transparency
regulation that enables consumers to more easily compare
price and quality; liberalized professional licensing laws that
increase access to affordable basic care; standards for inter-
competition [http://perma.cc/3V2E-4BX2].  The FTC has also hosted public
events on a range of new developments in the health care industry under both its
competition and its consumer protection authorities.
376 See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013),
aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (state board engaged in anticompetitive conduct by
sending cease-and-desist letters to nondentists engaged in tooth whitening).
377 See Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry, supra note 203; R
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organiza-
tions Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,026–32 (Oct. 28, 2011).
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operability among health information systems and digital med-
ical devices; and modifications to government oversight that
increase the diversity of cost-effective diagnostic and therapeu-
tic aids, such as mobile health technologies for remote care and
self-management.
1. Stop Paying for Random Inputs
Payment reform is both the most promising and the most
often attempted strategy to improve health care products.  Al-
though the health care system has experimented for decades
with different approaches to provider payment, until recently
little attention had been paid to delivering useful increments of
care at the lowest possible cost of production.  In addition to
the systematic efforts currently being tested, a few innovative
health care providers have voluntarily adopted assembled, “all-
inclusive” prices for some surgical procedures and selected
other services.378
Some private insurers employ a technique called “value-
based insurance design” (V-BID), which offers more generous
coverage of services that are known to be effective.379  V-BID is
often applied to preventive screening based on the predictive
value of particular tests in a given subpopulation, but coverage
can also be modified to induce beneficiaries to receive care that
meets clinical guidelines, or to seek services from providers of
demonstrably higher quality or greater cost-effectiveness.380
V-BID represents an indirect strategy to improve the assembly
of individual treatments into effective packages through in-
formed, incentivized consumer choice; it does not explicitly re-
quire providers to alter their production functions.381
“Bundled payment” programs come much closer to paying
for products rather than process steps or isolated inputs and
do so more directly.382  “Bundled” usually refers to a single
payment that encompasses both the professional (physician)
378 Michael E. Chernew et al., Value-Based Insurance Design, 26 HEALTH AFF.
195, 196 (2007); Tina Rosenberg, Revealing a Health Care Secret: The Price, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2013 (describing the Surgery Center of Oklahoma, an ambulatory
surgery center owned by a group of conservative physicians).
379 See Chernew et al., supra note 378, at 203 (asserting value-based insur- R
ance Design (VBID) explicitly acknowledges and responds to patient
heterogeneity).
380 Id. at 195–96.
381 Id.
382 Jaspen, supra note 140 (explaining how bundled payment systems func- R
tion); Jordan Rau, Hospitals Face Pressure From Medicare to Avert Readmissions,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, at D1 (explaining how, under the traditional payment
model, hospitals were not concerned with readmissions).
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and facility (hospital) components of conventional reimburse-
ment systems, thereby rewarding care in which individuals
with complementary skills work together in technologically ad-
vanced practice settings.383  Such payments are also usually
“episodic,” meaning that they encompass a sustained period of
time, such as a full course of illness or the duration of a defini-
tive (and typically effective) modality of treatment.  The PRO-
METHEUS project, for example, was an early bundled payment
initiative in which private insurers attempted to reward the
coordinated delivery of care that met clinical practice guide-
lines for quality.384
An important bundled payment experiment was a pilot
program sponsored by the Integrated Healthcare Association
and the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  It
aspired to negotiate twenty contracts between California insur-
ers and providers for bundled payment, and to test not less
than 500 paid bundles for cost and quality.385
The pilot concluded in early 2014 and was judged a failure
by its evaluators, largely because it did not achieve the desired
scale.386  However, other experts drew constructive if nuanced
lessons from the experience that will be important in any larger
move toward assembled products that distinguishes bundled
payment from the wholesale transfer of insurance risk to prov-
iders.  These lessons include paying retrospectively for the care
bundles actually delivered rather than projecting utilization in
advance, incorporating care redesign when creating payment
bundles, targeting markets that currently pay providers using
fee-for-service rather than capitation, and allowing Medicare to
lead the effort because of its size and measurement capacity.387
Despite these results, Medicare doubled down on bundled
payment in 2015.  CMS expanded its optional Bundled Pay-
ment for Care Improvement (BPCI) program and declared that
383 Holly Korda & Gloria N. Eldridge, Payment Incentives and Integrated Care
Delivery: Levers for Health System Reform and Cost Containment, 48 INQUIRY 277,
280–82 (2011).
384 Peter S. Hussey et al., The PROMETHEUS Bundled Payment Experiment, 30
HEALTH AFF. 2116 (2011) (explaining that the name Prometheus was chosen in the
hopes that health care would be forever changed).
385 Tom Williams & Jill Yegian, Bundled Payment: Learning Payment from our
Failures, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 5, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/
08/05/bundled-payment-learning-from-our-failures/ [http://perma.cc/7BZA-
GZZ4].
386 Ridgely et al., supra note 36 (discussing California’s bundled care R
initiative).
387 Williams & Yegian, supra note 385 (suggesting payers, providers, and pol- R
icy makers should continue to pursue bundled payment initiatives).
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its Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement program would
apply bundled payment on a mandatory basis in seventy-five
markets.388  After decades of political posturing, Congress also
repealed its longstanding but never enforced Sustainable
Growth Rate (SGR) limitation on physician fees under Medi-
care, conditioned on the implementation of value-based pay-
ment systems such as bundling.389
2. Publish Prices and Results
Transparency rivals payment reform as the most popular
form of market-oriented health care regulation.  Although
mandatory disclosure of information about health care delivery
can have various objectives—including loyalty to patients, in-
ternal process improvement, and stewardship of public re-
sources—most disclosure initiatives over the last twenty years
have sought primarily to improve competition by better inform-
ing buyers about health plans or health care providers.390
Standardized information is seen as a remedy for unjusti-
fied variation in both quality and price.  Early transparency
programs attempted mainly to measure and compare quality of
care.  For hospitals and surgeons, they were often a response to
research showing wide variation in care processes and re-
sults.391  For health plans, they were instituted primarily to
address public concerns that managed care would shortchange
quality in order to reduce cost.392  When aggressive care man-
388 See Robert E. Mechanic, Mandatory Medicare Bundled Payment—Is it
Ready for Prime Time?, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1291, 1291 (2015); Suzanne
Delbanco, The Payment Reform Landscape: Bundled Payment, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(July 2, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/02/the-payment-reform-
landscape-bundled-payment [http://perma.cc/55YV-3YXY]; Steven A. Farmer et
al., Breaking Down Medicare’s Bold New Proposal to Transform Hip and Knee
Replacements, BROOKINGS (Aug. 11, 2015, 1:12 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/health360/posts/2015/08/joint-replacement-model-care [http://perma.
cc/YZM5-SMA7].
389 See Billy Wynne, May the Era of Medicare’s Doc Fix (1997–2015) Rest In
Peace. Now What?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2015, 10:09 PM), http://healthaf
fairs.org/blog/2015/04/14/may-the-era-of-medicares-doc-fix-1997-2015-rest-
in-peace-now-what [http://perma.cc/7SGE-FUNT].
390 Sage, supra note 128, at 1713–15 (assessing the justifications for requiring R
insurance organizations and health care providers to disclose information to the
public).
391 Mark R. Chassin, Achieving and Sustaining Improved Quality: Lessons from
New York State and Cardiac Surgery, 21 HEALTH AFF. 40, 51 (2002) (explaining
that since 1989 the New York State Department of Health has published annual
data on risk-adjusted mortality following coronary artery bypass graft surgery by
hospital and surgeon).
392 Anna D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in
Health Care—Challenges and Potential Effects, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 891, 891–92
(2011).
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agement receded as a threat to quality but spending continued
to rise, price transparency designed to aid comparison shop-
ping became an equally important focus of disclosure
initiatives.393
With respect to quality, process-based measures have long
been regarded as inferior to verifiable outcomes such as avoid-
ance of complications, relief of symptoms, or survival.394  But it
has been difficult to attribute outcomes to particular providers
when a mix of health care professionals and health facilities
supply and control care inputs for a given patient, or to mean-
ingfully aggregate results under the umbrella of a health plan
when one beneficiary’s experience of care is so different from
another’s.
With respect to prices, publicizing fees for conventional
disaggregated services has had a similarly limited impact.  For
many medical problems, it is often impossible to get a reliable
price quote in advance because nobody knows how many billa-
ble process steps will be taken or inputs used before diagnosis
or treatment is declared complete.395  Instead, current initia-
tives to contain cost through price transparency often en-
courage patients under active treatment to be prudent
purchasers of expensive diagnostic services, such as CT or MRI
scans, that can be multiply sourced.396  However, few patients
have sufficient expertise to make decisions about marginal in-
puts to complex care, especially when ill and under time pres-
sure.  By contrast, published prices and quality metrics are
much more meaningful for assembled products such as full
surgical treatment packages.397 Well-designed programs for
393 MEDICARE.GOV, How to Compare Medigap Policies (2014), http://
www.medicare.gov/supplement-other-insurance/compare-medigap/compare-
medigap.html [http://perma.cc/QBB3-CAG2]; Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note
392, at 894 (suggesting one tactic for reducing spending is to increase price R
transparency in health care).
394 Jonathan Mant, Process Versus Outcome Indicators in the Assessment of
Quality of Health Care, 13 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 475, 475–80 (2001)
(reviewing the relative strengths and weaknesses of outcome and process mea-
sures as performance indicators in health care).
395 See Barbara Starfield et al., Ambulatory Care Groups: A Categorization of
Diagnoses for Research and Management, 26 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 53, 54 (1991)
(explaining that in ambulatory care, for example, doctors make many diagnoses
and generate bills at different sites).
396 See Kristin Madison & Peter D. Jacobson, Debate: Consumer-Directed
Health Care, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 107, 116–17 (2007) (arguing that a transparency-
driven system will incentivize underinvestment in preventive measures).
397 At the Surgery Center of Oklahoma, for example, assembled prices availa-
ble on the website include the facility fee, the surgeon’s fee, the anesthesiologist’s
fee, the initial consultation, and uncomplicated follow-up care.  Implants and
similar devices are billed at cost without markup. SURGERY CTR. OF OKLA., Surgery
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both quality and price transparency therefore can help move
health care markets toward assembled products because as-
sembled products are better suited for comparison shopping.
3. Distinguish Warranty Risk from Insurance Risk
Efforts to reduce fragmentation in health care delivery
without explicitly redefining the product tend to elide the dis-
tinction between “warranty risk” (the risk that a health care
service will not work as intended, also called “performance
risk”) and “insurance risk” (the risk that an individual will have
a covered medical need).398  For example, a commentary on the
failure of the IHA bundled payment pilot in California noted:
“Prospective bundled payment raised . . . concerns for . . .
regulators . . . , including whether providers were assuming
insurance risk.”399  Similarly, hospitals and physicians partici-
pating in the Medicare shared-savings (ACO) program have dis-
covered that providing disassembled services for less than
Medicare expects to spend each year on a given beneficiary
requires essentially the same actuarial capacity as becoming a
full-fledged Medicare HMO.400
That capitation is the opposite of fee-for-service payment
has become a common misconception in health policy.  The
false dichotomy likely arises from the bidirectional heritage of
health insurance as it has developed in the United States.  On
one end of the spectrum, commercial insurers traditionally in-
demnified policyholders for the cost of process steps and com-
ponents delivered or ordered by physicians.  On the other end
of the spectrum, early HMOs such as Kaiser provided compre-
hensive care directly in exchange for an annual premium.401
Because neither sufficient capital nor compatible culture exis-
ted to replicate Kaiser-like HMOs on a national scale as man-
aged care expended in the 1990s, many provider contracts
attempted to make physicians in private practice behave simi-
Pricing (2015), http://www.surgerycenterok.com/pricing/ [http://perma.cc/
A45F-8SX7].
398 But cf. Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
128, 129 (2004) (offering a taxonomy of liability risk that includes warranty risk).
399 Williams & Yegian, supra note 385 (suggesting payers, providers, and pol- R
icy makers should continue to pursue bundled payment initiatives despite previ-
ous failure in California).
400 See, e.g., Susan DeVore & R. Wesley Champion, Driving Population Health
Through Accountable Care Organizations, 30 HEALTH AFF. 41, 41–49 (2011) (outlin-
ing the criteria health systems must meet to participate in the ACO model).
401 RICKEY HENDRICKS, A MODEL FOR NATIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE HISTORY OF
KAISER PERMANENTE (HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY) 1–10 (1993)
(presenting a history of Kaiser-Permanente).
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larly by paying them a fixed monthly amount for each patient
assigned to them (i.e., capitation) regardless of how much care
they actually deliver, in essence making them partial insurers
of their patients’ health.402
If products are sold assembled, warranty risk has less
overlap with insurance risk and can be separately managed.  If
a course of treatment fails to have the desired effect, a second
course of treatment can be delivered without charge.  If an
unwanted side effect develops, steps to mitigate the effect can
be offered, again without charge.  If these costs turn out to be
excessive for the seller, it is a signal that either the product
should be reengineered or the price charged for it should be
adjusted.  In either event, however, the cost of the warranty
remains under the control of the seller and is based on the
product’s average anticipated user and use.  As with many con-
sumer products, more comprehensive warranties might be of-
fered for higher prices, and health care providers (rather than
patients) are free to purchase stop-loss insurance against the
risk of unexpectedly high warranty costs.403
A few ongoing Medicare and private patient safety initia-
tives contemplate warranties, including nonpayment policies
for hospital readmissions that occur shortly after discharge, or
for “never events” such as wrong-site surgery or infections ac-
quired in the hospital that are deemed preventable.404  But
government payers and state regulators can encourage war-
ranties to be offered for a broader array of assembled products.
Geisinger Health System, for example, has experimented with a
402 See supra text accompanying note 192. R
403 An interesting question, beyond the scope of this Article, is the potential
relationship between warranties for assembled health care products and medical
malpractice liability.  For example, should a patient’s failure to cooperate in treat-
ment constitute product misuse that voids the warranty, akin to contributory
negligence in tort?  Little has been written about the use of warranties in medical
care. See William S. Brewbaker III, supra note 116, at 118–21 (arguing that R
courts should impose a tort-based implied warranty of quality on managed care
organizations, under which they would be liable for selling physician services that
are negligently rendered).
404 Peter J. Pronovost et al., Preventing Bloodstream Infections: A Measurable
National Success Story in Quality Improvement, 30 HEALTH AFF. 628, 628–34
(2011) (discussing the success in combating central line-associated bloodstream
infections); AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, Patient Safety Primers: Never
Events, http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=3 [http://perma.cc/
K6PG-BJKM] (defining “never events”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS,
Readmissions Reduction Program (2015), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Readmissions-
Reduction-Program.html [https://perma.cc/9ZKK-4Q76]; NAT’L QUALITY FORUM,
List of SREs (2015), http://www.qualityforum.org/Topics/SREs/
List_of_SREs.aspx [https://perma.cc/2LZU-EU6X].
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flat fee including a 90-day warranty for certain cardiovascular
and orthopedic procedures.405
4. Try New Products and Producers
Assembled products offering quicker, cheaper, more relia-
ble health care will only develop if competitors with fresh ideas
continually enter the market.  New competitors are more likely
to create products with intuitive appeal and measurable bene-
fits.  Generating new health care products and services there-
fore should be a priority for regulators working in tandem with
competition authorities.  Unlike many clinical innovations to-
day, notably medical devices and imaging technologies, future
entrants should do more than fit their products into the ex-
isting schema of “fee-for-input” payment.406  Over time, this
process could induce a virtuous circle that continues to rede-
fine health care products and invites even greater diversity in
sources of supply and methods of production.
To encourage competition from unaccustomed sources,
policymakers should dismantle regulatory barriers that dis-
courage market entry by new types of health facilities, such as
burdensome permitting and certification requirements,407 and
by health care professionals, such as restrictive professional
licensing laws.408  Reducing barriers to entry is also important
from the perspective of antitrust enforcement.  If entry is easy,
405 See Reed Abelson, In Bid for Better Hospital Care, Heart Surgery with a
Warranty, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2007, at A1.  Not discussed in the article is the fact
that Geisinger apparently offers its “Proven Care” guarantee only to patients en-
rolled in its own health plan and not to those covered by other commercial insur-
ance.  This significantly reduces the financial risk of poor performance and allows
Geisinger to continue to be paid by others for treating complications.
406 Katherine Hobson, Cost of Medicine: Are High Tech Medical Devices and
Treatments Always Worth It?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 10, 2009), http://
health.usnews.com/health-news/best-hospitals/articles/2009/07/10/cost-of-
medicine-are-high-tech-medical-devices-and-treatments-always-worth-it [http://
perma.cc/76ZZ-QE6D] (questioning whether expensive medical tools are
overused).
407 See Nancy Pfotenhauer & Nathan Nascimento, States Strike a Blow for
Freedom in the ObamaCare Age, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/nancy-pfotenhauer-and-nathan-nascimento-states-strike-a-blow-
for-freedom-in-the-obamacare-age-1424482226 [https://perma.cc/857P-4CM5].
408 See, e.g., N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107–17
(2015); see also Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 1:15–cv–00343–RP
(W.D. Tex. 2015) (antitrust suit by a telehealth company against a state medical
board for prohibiting the writing of a prescription without a face-to-face visit);
William M. Sage, Competitive Harm from State Licensing Boards: First North Caro-
lina Dentists, Now Texas Physicians?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 2015), http://
healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/27/competitive-harm-from-state-licensing-
boards-first-north-carolina-dentists-now-texas-physicians/ [http://perma.cc/
93ZA-VLTC] (describing and assessing the Teladoc litigation).
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market power cannot be exercised even in concentrated mar-
kets without attracting alternative sources of supply that
would return prices to competitive levels.409  Moreover, ease of
market entry should intensify overall innovation, further re-
ducing the risk of consumer harm from concentration.
5. Empower True Consumers
That patients need to be partners in their own care is a
possible objection to assembled products.410  It is true that
patients can either enhance or undercut the effectiveness of
treatment and therefore the apparent rewards from offering a
superior product.411  As in other commercial sectors, however,
consumers become motivated when they understand what they
are buying and can compare their options.  People seeking
medical care may be vulnerable and in need of compassionate,
expert assistance, but being limited to disaggregated, unwar-
ranted services exploits that vulnerability to a greater degree
than if products came assembled with warranties.
To date, personal responsibility has mainly been incorpo-
rated into health insurance design, not utilization of care.  Be-
cause of the perverse incentives associated with spending other
people’s money (“moral hazard”), health savings accounts,
high-deductible health plans, and similar forms of “consumer-
directed care” have become increasingly popular with more
conservative constituencies.412  However, even prudent people
can quickly incur thousands of dollars in health expense for
disaggregated services.  A move to assembled products would
make it easier for such individuals to comparison shop based
on price without shortchanging or otherwise misinterpreting
their medical needs.  Over time, assembled products could
bridge the gap between consumer-directed care models and the
“comprehensive coverage” mindset of the ACA because direct
409 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 200, § 4.2 (discuss- R
ing barriers to entry).
410 See Joanna Kaufman, Patients as Partners, 39 NURSING MGMT. 45, 48
(2008) (discussing the history of the “patients as partners” concept).
411 Using the more paternalistic terminology of conventional medical profes-
sionalism, the same idea is sometimes called “patient compliance,” meaning ac-
quiescence in the plan of treatment selected by the physician. See TO ERR IS
HUMAN, supra note 118, at 34-35 (pointing out patient noncompliance as an R
important quality issue in health care).
412 See JOHN C. GOODMAN, PRICELESS: CURING THE HEALTHCARE CRISIS 143–57
(2012) (asserting the United States needs real health care change, starting with
health savings accounts). But see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,
75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 243 (1996) (exploring the shortcomings of moral hazard as a
neutral, technical basis for reforming tort law, workers’ compensation, health
insurance, and social welfare programs).
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sellers of services would have less ability to take advantage of
buyers.413
Regulators therefore might apply a lighter hand to direct-
to-consumer sales for assembled than for unassembled health
care products,414 using a consumer protection model to pro-
mote both customization of assembled products by sellers and
correct use of those products by consumers.  Admittedly, it is
difficult to draw a line between lack of user friendliness, which
producers should have strong incentives to improve, and mis-
use, which should obligate the consumer to purchase another
or a different product.  However, complex medical products
should not require self-assembly by patients any more than
they should require ad hoc assembly by physicians, as they do
at present.
6. Assure Interoperability
Many health care services require expert coordination,
much as one flies on a reputable commercial airline rather
than separately hiring a plane, pilot, and maintenance crew.
Because so few health care products are sold assembled, as-
sembly is considerably harder than it should be.  Beyond the
purely mechanical realm of items such as IV tubing and surgi-
cal supplies, surprisingly few components of complex health
care fit together.
The development and adoption of industrial standards that
enable interoperable technology is a precondition to the effi-
cient production of assembled products in many care settings.
Digital devices such as electrocardiogram machines, radio-
graphic scanners, and chemical assayers seldom talk with one
another or with the often idiosyncratic electronic health record
systems that hospitals and physicians have installed.415
413 For example, the federal government recently prohibited supplemental fees
for biopsies performed during screening colonoscopies, which are covered without
cost-sharing under the ACA. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COVERAGE OF COLONOSCO-
PIES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S PREVENTION BENEFIT 11 (2012), http://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/8351-coverage-of-colonos
copies-under-the-affordable-care-act.pdf [http://perma.cc/P3P7-QEKL].  In es-
sence, this converted screening colonoscopy into an assembled product for the
diagnosis of large bowel disease.
414 Cf. Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs:
Creating Consumer Demand, 281 JAMA 382, 384 (1999) (discussing the pharma-
ceutical industry’s rapid increase in marketing prescription drugs directly to pa-
tients and the FDA’s relaxed regulation of this practice).
415 See INST. OF MED., HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY: BUILDING SAFER SYSTEMS FOR
BETTER CARE 19 (2012) (concluding “the current culture of care delivery is often
not ready for widespread safer and more effective use of health IT”).
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Lack of interoperability also extends to communication
and teamwork among skilled personnel.  Health care teams
seldom function as smoothly as teams in true “high-reliability”
industries.416  Industrial engineering that takes account of
human factors in designing standardized work environments
and training personnel therefore is critical for preventing medi-
cal errors and promoting successful outcomes.417
More generally, standards for interoperability tend to im-
prove innovation and induce the entry of additional competi-
tors by reducing the cost of contracting between new and
existing market participants.418  Because of this, dominant
health care providers may resist or attempt to undermine stan-
dards for interoperability, requiring vigilance by the antitrust
enforcement agencies.419
For simpler health care, standards for interoperability
should help individuals assemble their own packages of ser-
vices.  Airlines thrive, but there are few remaining travel agents
because most travelers can construct their own itineraries us-
ing standardized electronic tools.  Similarly, “coordination of
care” was traditionally the professional obligation of one’s gen-
eral practice physician, and its loss is often lamented as a
casualty of specialization.  However, low-risk patients may not
need close or comprehensive attention, especially if it adds an-
other layer of intermediation to a system that is already unre-
sponsive to consumer preferences.  Instead, regulators should
promote “plug and play” capability, including for the exchange
of health information, enabling consumers to manage their
own care from diverse sources in real time.
7. Clarify the Role of Health Insurers
The unequal distribution of illness, its unpredictable tim-
ing, and the high cost of care make insurance an inevitable
aspect of a functioning health care system.  Still, although
416 See M. Leonard, S. Graham & D. Bonacum, The Human Factor: The Critical
Importance of Effective Teamwork and Communication in Providing Safe Care, 13
QUALITY SAFE HEALTH CARE 85, 90 (2004) (noting effective communication and
teamwork are essential for the delivery of high quality, safe patient care).
417 See Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994) (indi-
cating that “a substantial number of patients suffer treatment-caused injuries
while in the hospital”); INST. OF MED., supra note 119, at 26 (estimating that as R
many as 98,000 people die in any given year from medical errors that occur in
hospitals).
418 See Baker, supra note 280, at 560–62 (noting that “antitrust enforcement R
against exclusionary conduct is important because it fosters economic growth
and prosperity, not just because it addresses harms to price competition”).
419 See id. at 561.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 89 16-MAR-16 15:47
2016] ASSEMBLED PRODUCTS 697
commercial health insurers remain ubiquitous, the value they
add is increasingly in doubt.  As discussed above, underwriting
risk has diminished for the majority of health insurers, either
because that function can be performed at lower cost by large,
self-insured employers and government (Medicare and Medi-
caid) or because laws such as the ACA limit insurers’ actuarial
role and cushion the financial uncertainty associated with
it.420  Thus, much of what is called health insurance is prima-
rily the provision of administrative services: managing enroll-
ment, verifying eligibility, contracting with health care
providers, and processing claims.421
Because the future of health insurance beyond administra-
tion is uncertain, health insurers are likely to diversify their
operations to include other functions, such as care coordina-
tion, price brokering, health information stewardship, and
health promotion.  Whether the ACA will induce more insurers
to be actual care managers offering assembled products re-
mains to be seen.422  Insurers’ current dependence on claims
processing to earn revenue may exert drag on any shift to as-
sembled products because consolidating services into larger
packages would tend to reduce the overall volume of claims.423
Regulators should be alert to such dampened incentives for
change and to status quo bias associated with current patterns
of managed care contracting.
If conventional health insurance recedes in importance,
regulators will need to anticipate and address other ways in
which the unequal distribution of illness may complicate com-
petition over assembled products.  Examples include prevent-
ing profiteering in connection with urgent care or life-
threatening illness, overseeing companies selling warranty in-
surance to health care providers, and using public funds to
support reserve capacity (e.g., emergency care for epidemics or
disasters) so that day-to-day production decisions can be made
with lean inventory and flexible staffing.
420 See Sage, supra note 133, at 1090. R
421 See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. R
422 One consideration is that the ACA “risk-adjusts” premiums received by
health plans to reduce cherry-picking of healthy enrollees, provide assurances of
profitability, and maintain overall budget neutrality. See Sage, supra note 133, at R
1090.  These risk-reduction devices may promote overall insurance market stabil-
ity, but they also may tend to diminish competition between carriers.
423 See supra text accompanying notes 94–100. R
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8. Promote “Upstream” Health Care
An affordable health care system depends on good underly-
ing health as well as cost-effective treatment.424  It will take
innovation for the United States to reduce preventable mortal-
ity and morbidity to the levels found in many other developed
countries.425  Although population health is often considered a
government function administered by state and local health
departments, networked technologies create enormous oppor-
tunities for private entrepreneurship.426
Imagine people navigating a river, with their health wors-
ening as the journey progresses.  As people get farther from
home, assistance becomes available, but it is abundant only
when travelers are in distant lands and in great peril, with
rescue costly and uncertain.  This downstream realm repre-
sents the vast majority of U.S. health care as currently con-
figured.  Upstream, the current is slower, the shore is nearer,
and people are closer to home.  There are no “patients” removed
from their daily lives; there are only people living those lives.
Upstream competition policy should foster the development of
diverse sources of care widely distributed throughout commu-
nities, facilitate public access to these services, and encourage
self-management of health and illness.  Services that can ac-
complish these goals may be less complex than those associ-
ated with acute or severe illness, but they will still need to be
assembled for direct consumer use.
It is therefore important that regulators not allow existing
health insurers, health care providers, or pharmaceutical com-
panies to foreclose competition by extending their existing reg-
ulatory advantages upstream.427  Potentially problematic
conduct might include influencing professional licensing and
discipline, leveraging facility licensing or certificates of need,
manipulating accreditation standards, or otherwise taking un-
fair advantage of incumbents’ familiarity with complex regula-
tory systems.  For example, mobile medical applications
(mHealth) constitute a rapidly growing commercial sector that
424 See Sage, supra note 133, at 1085. R
425 See Steven H. Woolf & Laudan Y. Aron, The US Health Disadvantage Rela-
tive to Other High–Income Countries, 309 JAMA 771, 772 (2013) (comparing Amer-
icans’ health to that of other countries of similar economic status).
426 See, e.g., William H. Frist, Connected Health and the Rise of the Patient-
Consumer, 33 HEALTH AFF. 191, 192 (2014) (discussing consumer products to
improve health behaviors).
427 Governance of upstream health care will differ in many ways from govern-
ance of downstream health care. See Sage & McIlhattan, supra note 104, at 537- R
38.
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the FDA has wisely refrained from regulating unless there is a
clear risk to health or safety.428
CONCLUSION
Improved competition, greater productive efficiency, and
enhanced consumer value are no longer optional in American
health care.  Experts agree that the high health care spending
that prevails in the United States is not merely the price of
scientific progress or the consumption preferences of a pros-
perous and powerful nation, as it appeared in prior decades.  It
has become a hard constraint on public money available for
other critical needs, such as education and infrastructure, a
drain on employment compensation that crowds out cash
wages, and a long-term threat to the fiscal stability of the
United States.429
This Article urges antitrust enforcers and regulators to re-
think the products that the health care system buys and sells.
Because market competition usually determines its own goals,
a directive approach to competition policy may seem counterin-
tuitive.  Health care products, however, are heavily influenced
by decades of accreted laws and professional norms that en-
able both the medical profession and the insurance industry to
cast long shadows over the health care economy.  Users of
health care are seldom choosers of health care, and even less
often bear the costs.430  Prices are simultaneously extravagant
and invisible.  As a result, some parts of health care are aston-
ishingly innovative (e.g., how to keep preterm babies alive)
while others are surprisingly not (e.g., how to deal with a
sprained ankle on a Sunday).
Although the Affordable Care Act articulates a “triple aim”
for health care reform, including improvements in individual
428 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUS-
TRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 8 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/
UCM263366.pdf [http://perma.cc/V38U-XU83]. But see Nathan Cortez, Regulat-
ing Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 227 (2014) (arguing that
regulators need not be tentative about regulating mobile health technologies).
429 Political opponents may deride the Obama administration’s claim to pur-
sue deficit reduction through health reform, but health care remains the only
sector in which achievable efficiencies yield savings exceeding full percentage
points of GDP. See Peter R. Orszag, Will Burwell Corral Health-Care Costs?,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr. 14, 2014, 11:53 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/arti
cles/2014-04-14/will-burwell-corral-health-care-costs [http://perma.cc/C38E-9
FSA] (describing potential for health care reform to substantially reduce federal
debt).
430 See supra notes 410–12 and accompanying text. R
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health, population health, and economic efficiency,431 anti-
trust authorities have yet fully to internalize its priorities into
their enforcement strategies.  Instead, a considerable amount
of antitrust enforcement remains mired in market models that
emerged during the political backlash against managed care in
the late 1990s and that have not produced significant benefits
for consumers.432  Antitrust enforcers should recognize the ar-
tificiality of what currently passes for competition in health
care and should work collaboratively with regulators to move
health care markets beyond trade in disaggregated process
steps and inputs to the sale of fully assembled products with
warranties.
The ACA, which has very likely achieved political perma-
nence, relies primarily on market forces to boost performance
in the health care system.433  Unfortunately, efforts to improve
the cost-effectiveness of health care have a discouraging his-
tory, with few accomplishments outside the traditional HMO
model.434  Reversing the scarcity of assembled products may
begin to secure for health care the efficiency gains that free
enterprise has brought to almost every other economic sector.
Experienced clinicians are seldom fooled by miracle cures.
Serious illnesses that are slow to develop are typically slow to
reverse, wisdom that applies also to the severe and complex
pathology of the American health care system.  Redirecting an-
titrust enforcement and associated regulation to favor assem-
bled, warrantable products is not a panacea for market failure
in health care.  It is, however, a critical supplement to the
analytics currently being employed by competition policymak-
ers in pursuit of their goals.
431 See INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, supra note 206. R
432 See BERENSON & BURTON, supra note 8 and accompanying text. R
433 See supra text accompanying notes 1, 7. R
434 See supra text accompanying notes 152–55. R
